

### *Esprit Dokdo III*

In the painting featured on the cover, master artist Lee Jong-sang identifies the ruggedness of the rocky island with the resilience of the Korean people.

# D o *k* d o *o* *r* *e* *a*

## **Dokdo in the Eyes of the World**

International Media and Scholars Discuss the History of Dokdo

About Lee Jong–Sang, *the Artist Featured on the Cover*

Korea’s leading master painter, arts educator and curator, Lee Jong-sang was graduated from Seoul National University (SNU) in 1963 with a BA in East Asian painting. He received a PhD in East Asian philosophy from Dongguk University in 1989. While teaching fine arts at SNU from 1966 through 2003, Prof. Lee served as a member or director of a number of important domestic and international cultural organizations and events. In 2004, he became a member of the Academy of Arts of Korea, an ultimate honor bestowed on the most accomplished artists by the Republic. He also has executed an array of Dokdo paintings with great passion ever since he first visited the island in 1977. He and his colleagues say that their art works on Dokdo are just one more piece of evidence that the island has always been part of Korea culturally as well as geographically. Lee’s adventure into Dokdo and other national landmarks represent a lifetime pursuit to reveal the essence of traditional arts.

# Dokdo and the East Sea

Yuji Hosaka Professor of Japanese Studies, Sejong University, Seoul, Korea

The Dokdo issue has deep historical roots. In the late 17th century, the Edo bakufu (江戸幕府, the administrative arm of the Tokugawa shogunate) launched an inquiry into Tottori Prefecture (鳥取縣, in southeastern Japan), after locals were found to have traveled to Ulleungdo and back. The official finding was that neither Ulleungdo nor Dokdo belonged to Japan, and the Edo Government subsequently decreed that Tottori Prefecture citizens could no longer visit Ulleungdo. Thus, the Japanese by their own admission clearly recognized that both Ulleungdo and Dokdo were Joseon (Korea, 1392-1910) possessions more than three hundred years ago. The shogunate produced officially authorized maps of Japanese territory six different times between the 17th and early 19th centuries, and neither of the two islands was included on any of those maps. Rather, the cartography was drawn in such a way as to indicate that Dokdo and Ulleungdo were part of Joseon.

That is not all. The Japanese Great Council of State (太政官), the highest authority in the Meiji Government, issued written instructions twice, first in 1870 and again in 1877, ordering the Ministry of the Interior to bear in mind that Ulleungdo and Dokdo were not Japanese possessions. Both of those documents referred to the

17th century incident involving Ulleungdo.

While knowing these facts, the Japanese Government harbored great ambitions over the East Sea. The Great Council of State was abolished in 1885 and succeeded by a Cabinet similar to the one in place today. The structural change provided an opportunity for the Japanese authorities to illegally ignore the 1877 instructions and incorporate Dokdo into Shimane Prefecture in 1905.

Many officials still in the government in 1905 were aware of the Great Council of State's 1877 written instructions ruling that Dokdo belonged to Korea. However, the Ministry of the Navy was determined to use Dokdo for military purposes and railroaded through the legislation that resulted in Japan's theft of Dokdo. The 1905 incorporation of Dokdo into Shimane Prefecture, which ignored the written instructions of the Great Council of State in 1877, can be construed to be a violation of Japan's own laws.

Meanwhile in 1900, the Daehan Empire Government (Korea, 1897-1910) issued Imperial Decree No. 41, proclaiming to the world that Dokdo (then referred to as Seokdo, 石島) was part of Ulleung County.

The Japanese Government conceded that Dokdo was Korean territory in 1877 and knew the

existence of Imperial Decree No. 41. The Japanese could not let the Koreans know of the Dokdo incorporation when it occurred (in 1905) because they would have had to give it back if the Koreans had so demanded.

The word came out only in 1906, after Japan had forced the Koreans to conclude a Protectorate Treaty in November of the previous year. That treaty denied the Koreans their diplomatic voice. Unable to mount an official diplomatic protest, the Koreans could only object to the Dokdo annexation by writing pieces for the local newspapers and such. Dokdo was annexed into Japanese territory by force in the process of Japan's invasion of Korea. This fact goes to the very heart of the debate over Dokdo; namely, the Dokdo issue is a historical matter before it is one of territoriality.

Japan is currently working to expand its maritime domain and has again started to insist on its rights to Dokdo. An issue settled in the 17th century reemerged in the course of Japanese modernization, with Japan illegally making Dokdo part of its territory in the early 20th century. Now Japan has begun to forcibly make the case that Dokdo is a Japanese possession in order to secure for itself an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles. Any evidence that is disadvantageous to its

argument—such as the 1877 documents—is strictly kept hidden. Meanwhile, academics in the government's employ are hard at work distorting the historical record.

The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Government agencies are now suggesting that Japan secured the territorial rights to Dokdo in the mid-17th century. This is an extremely distorted claim. Japanese officials are aware that Ulleungdo was part of Korea in the mid-19th century, yet they still discuss at length how Ulleungdo was originally part of Japan. This directly shows that Japanese greed does not stop at wanting to control Dokdo but extends to the desire to rule all of the East Sea. The Japanese officials who maintain that the East Sea was historically named the "Sea of Japan" are also expressing their designs on the entire area.

Given this backdrop, I was very happy to hear that the Korean Overseas Information Service was publishing a compilation of writings by international journalists and various experts on Dokdo and the East Sea. The accurate understanding and truthful explanation of the facts are powerful tools for protecting one's legitimate rights. Ongoing public relations activities are desirable in order to prevail over distortions and cover-ups.





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
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by Professor Florian Coulmas, Universität Duisburg



# Specialists' Articles on Dokdo

In 2005, in a direct affront to the territorial integrity of the Republic of Korea and under the tacit encouragement of Tokyo, Japan? Shimane Prefecture proclaimed February 22 as Takeshima (Dokdo) Day, claiming that the easternmost island of Korea belonged to Japan. This booklet presents some insight into why, at this particular point in time, Japan has decided to make an issue out of Dokdo that has long been under the effective control of Korea. The seven distinguished authors featured here discuss historical, cultural and legal implications of the Dokdo issue.



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[Carolina Mera](#) Professor of Sociology, the University of Buenos Aires

# WHY DOKDO?

**John B. Duncan**  
Director, the Center for Korean Studies, UCLA

Professor John Duncan is a specialist in Korean history and has written several books on Korea, including *The Problematic Modernity of Confucianism: The Question of Civil Society in Choson Dynasty Korea*, and *The Origins of the Choson Dynasty*.

Why has the ownership of a set of rocky islets, known as Dokdo (Tokto) in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese, become a major issue in relations between South Korea and Japan in the past two years? One can offer several explanations, all true to some degree. These include economic interests in the fishing grounds and the 600 million tons of natural gas believed to lie under the seabed around Dokdo, the U.S. failure to specify sovereignty over the islets at the time of the conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan in 1951, Japanese tendencies to whitewash their imperial past and anti-colonial, anti-Japanese nationalist sentiment in Korea. But these explanations do not tell us why Dokdo has emerged as a controversy in 2005-06.

It should be noted that Japan has never accepted South Korea's occupation of the islets in 1954 and has over the years sought to have the issue brought before the International Court of Justice. Nonetheless, Dokdo remained on the back burner until early 2005—a year that had ironically been proclaimed as the Korea-Japan

Friendship Year—when Japan's Shimane Prefecture proclaimed February 22 as Takeshima Day. This was followed by a number of public statements by high-ranking Japanese officials, including the Japanese ambassador to South Korea, asserting Japan's claim to the islets, statements that have provoked strong reactions from Korea. Most recently, Japan, in an apparent effort to block South Korea's plan to register Korean names for the features of the Dokdo seabed, dispatched survey ships to Dokdo, to which South Korea responded by dispatching a small fleet of naval gunboats. Armed conflict was averted at the last minute by diplomatic efforts, but the problem remains unresolved, and it appears likely that Japan will continue to press its claim to Dokdo aggressively.

It seems to me that perhaps the best way to understand why Japan has now chosen, after decades of relatively low-key approaches, to escalate the conflict over Dokdo is to place the dispute within the larger context of changing global and Northeast Asian power relations. During the Cold



Japanese claims on foreign territory  
1 Dokdo of the Republic of Korea  
2 The Diaoyutai Islands, which are in dispute with the Chinese  
3 The Kuril Islands, which are former Japanese territory now occupied by the Russians



The location of Dokdo island (in the circle)

War era, both Japan and South Korea felt themselves to be highly dependent on the U.S. for protection against Communist bloc aggression and deferred open conflict over issues such as Dokdo under U.S. pressure for military, political, and economic cooperation. After the demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. was perceived as the world's only remaining "superpower," a perception that was reinforced by the U.S.-led military actions against Iraq in 1991 and again in 2003 that showcased American military technology. The aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, however, has revealed the limits of American military power, as the U.S., which had once boasted of possessing the capability to fight two wars at once, has become bogged down in a prolonged military conflict inside Iraq that increasingly appears unwinnable, a conflict for which the U.S. finds it difficult to mobilize sufficient manpower and for which U.S. public support is rapidly eroding. This raises serious doubts about U.S. military effectiveness and about long-term U.S. commitments to its allies and to the maintenance of global and

regional power configurations. Questions about the reliability of U.S. commitments are surely reinforced in Japan and South Korea by memories of the "Nixon shock" of the 1970s, when the U.S. abandoned South Vietnam, opened relations with Communist China, and withdrew a portion of U.S. military forces stationed in Northeast Asia. These doubts have been deepened further by the Bush Administration's unilateralism, a policy that can be read as meaning that the U.S. stands ready to sacrifice the interests of its long-standing allies in order to attain its own goals.

This produces the specter of a potential power vacuum in Northeast Asia, an area where there exists no effective regional institutional structure such as the European Union to mediate conflict and promote the interests of the region as a whole. This is happening within the context of a globalization process that is accelerating the flows of capital, people, and culture across national boundaries and that produces growing anxiety over the integrity of their borders among the nation-states of Northeast Asia. Nowhere is this



Dokdo is not only valuable politically and diplomatically, but is also a precious environmental and ecological resource. Warm and cold currents intersect here in the seas around Dokdo Island, making it an ideal habitat for subpolar, temperate, and subtropical seaweed, as well as a variety of fish.

more true than in Japan, which is engaged in territorial disputes with all of its neighbors: not only Dokdo with Korea, but also the Kurile Islands with Russia and the Senkaku Islands with China.

Given the multiplicity of its territorial disputes, one wonders why Japan has repeatedly chosen to make an issue of Dokdo. One possible reason might be the continuing pressure from Shimane Prefecture which has repeatedly agitated for declarations of Japanese sovereignty over the islets in recent decades. Another might be a perception among Japanese leaders that they can most easily coerce Korea, its former colony and a country far smaller than either China or Russia. At any rate, once Japan chose to press the Dokdo issue, the die was cast. If Japan backs off on Dokdo, it will weaken its negotiating position with China and Russia over the Senkaku and Kurile islands. Thus it seems probable that Japan will continue to assert claims of sovereignty over Dokdo in the coming years.

This, of course, entails serious risks for Japan. At a time when a reemerging China is

seeking to “restore” what it regards as its traditional hegemony over Northeast Asia, Japan’s hard line on Dokdo might force South Korea closer to China and leave Japan increasingly isolated, effectively foreclosing any possibility that Japan could compete with China for regional hegemony. This would, of course, play into the hands of those conservative, nationalist forces in Japan that seek to revise the Japanese Constitution to allow Japan to become a “normal nation” and engage in full-scale rearmament.

The implications of this scenario are ominous. It will heighten political and military tensions in a region that has already experienced four major wars in the past 110 years: the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, the Greater East Asian War (WW II), and the Korean War. At the same time, it lessens the likelihood of a satisfactory settlement of the North Korean nuclear arms issue, not only because Japan will have even less leverage over North Korea than it does now but also because a North Korea apprehensive of a rearmed, assertive, and nationalistic



*Bankokushinchizu* (New World Map, 萬國新地圖) published in 1892 by Nakamura Tanemitsu Do (中村種美堂), the largest map publisher in Japan at that time. On the Joseon part of this map, Ulleungdo and Dokdo are clearly shown as belonging to Korea.  
Source: Collection of Choe Suh-myun, Professor at Myongji University in Korea

Japan will be even more reluctant to abandon its nuclear program. Furthermore it will greatly complicate, if not make impossible, the creation of Northeast Asian economic and political cooperation. Instead of working together to promote the global interests of the region, Japan and its neighbors will be forced to expend much of their energy and wealth on intra-regional tension and conflict.

South Korea finds itself in a difficult position. It needs close relations with Japan as a counter-balance to Chinese hegemonic ambitions. It also needs cooperation from both Japan and China in order to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and to continue to make progress toward national reunification. But the Koreans have bitter memories of Japanese colonial rule and are increasingly

apprehensive that an increasingly conservative and nationalistic Japan may once again engage in aggression against their country. Koreans are fully aware that the assertion of Japanese suzerainty over Dokdo in 1905 was the first step toward the colonization of Korea in the early 20th century and are concerned that renewed Japanese claims of control over Dokdo one hundred years later may presage new aggression from Japan. This, of course, feeds into nationalist passions in Korea—indeed Dokdo may be the only issue that unites left and right in South Korea. Rising anti-Japanese sentiment may very well force South Korea into an inflexible position vis-à-vis Japan over Dokdo, an inflexibility that may spill over into other areas. Dealing with this issue will require a great deal of wisdom and patience on the part of the South Korean Government and people as they seek to negotiate their way through troubled times in Northeast Asia. The controversy over Dokdo may not go away, but one hopes that it can be managed in a way that minimizes the potential damage to Korea and to Northeast Asia.

## DOKDO'S POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

**Pilkyu Kim**  
Professor, University of Maryland

Pilkyu Kim is Professor and Academic Director of Government and Politics of the School of Undergraduate Studies at the University of Maryland. He has shown a special interest in studying and writing on the Dokdo issue.

The Koizumi Administration mobilized two Japanese Coast Guard survey ships to carry out a brazen hydrographic study of the waters around Dokdo. The ships returned to port only after Korea agreed to put off its registration of Korean-style names for the undersea features with the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO). The news of these developments left Koreans with mixed feelings. We can now predict that the Koizumi regime will defy Northeast Asia diplomatically regarding Dokdo.

Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 emboldened the Japanese to try seizing Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula. In the wake of the war, they had the audacity to propose a division of the Peninsula at the 38th parallel, with Russia controlling the North and Japan in control of the South. Then the Japanese became even more aggressive after defeating the Russians in 1905. They finally managed to make Korea their protectorate, seize control of Dokdo, and put the islets under the jurisdiction of Shimane Prefecture. Then in 1910, the entire Korean

Peninsula was forcefully subjugated by the Japanese, who oppressed the Koreans for 35 long, painful years.

The Japanese had to swallow the bitter pill of unconditional surrender to the United States in 1945. The people were plagued by feelings of inferiority and chronic pessimism. They swore to renounce war forever and included a passage (Article 9) to that effect in their Constitution.

At every available opportunity, don't these neighbors of Korea offer lip service to remorse for the suffering they brought to the Korean people? Koreans have tried to start trusting Japan, but then the Koizumi Administration engages in various provocations. The leadership visits Yasukuni Shrine despite Korean protestations, and a local government enacts "Takeshima Day." References to Dokdo are distorted in textbooks and plans are made to survey the waters around Dokdo. Koreans are incensed by the arrogant attitude of the Japanese, who only consider their diplomacy with the U.S. to be important while ignoring their Asian neighbors.



**Paldojeondo (Map of the Eight Provinces of Korea)**

This map is part of a nine-map atlas that includes the *jeondo* (complete map) and *paldobundo* (maps of each of the eight provinces). They were made in the first half of the 18th century based on the *Dongguk jido* (Map of Korea) made by Jeong Sang-gi (1678-1752). Dokdo is marked as Usan in the correct location to the east of Ulleungdo in the middle of the East Sea off the coast of Uljin.

Source: Collection of Yeungnam University Museum



Professor of Anthropology Ruth Benedict pointed out the duplicity of the Japanese national character in her work *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*. She describes a characteristic dichotomy that encompasses *hon ne* (本音, literally “main” or “original sound”), which refers to one’s actual motives, and *tatema* (建前, literally “before building,” namely erecting the framework), which means one’s stated intentions. The Japanese generally assume that one’s true intentions differ from one’s stated intentions.

Koreans must be aware of the strong superiority-inferiority complex of the Japanese, who are subservient and submissive in front of a more powerful adversary, while they are merciless to anyone who is weaker than they are. This complex is evident in the arrogant diplomacy of the Koizumi Government. The Japanese leaders are silent about the Kuril Islands, which are former Japanese territory now occupied by the Russians, and the Senkaku Islands, which are in dispute with the Chinese. They only try to take over Dokdo, which is Korean territory historically and



**Gangwondo-jido (Map of Gangwon-do Province)**

This map comprises part of *Daejoseonguk-jeondo* (A Complete Atlas of Great Joseon) drawn toward the end of the 19th century. Ulleungdo and Dokdo are depicted in the relatively accurate size and at the right location in the East Sea. Dokdo is specified as Usan on this map. Source: Collection of Dokdo Museum



in accordance with international law. Their duplicitous nature is also evident in the attitude of the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was sent to Korea to patch up relations after the Koreans responded forcefully to the Japanese dispatch of survey ships last April.

Whenever necessary, the Japanese claim that Takeshima (their name for Dokdo) is their territory, but the claim is false. Dokdo was put under the jurisdiction of Shimane Prefecture in 1905 under the pretext of *terra nullius*. However, Korean rights to the islets date back to 512, when they were discovered during the conquest of Usanguk (于山國, old name for Ulleungdo 鬱陵島) by Isabu (異斯夫), a Silla general under King Jijeung (智證王 r. 500-514). This fact was recorded in the *Samguksagi* (三國史記, History of the Three Kingdoms, compiled in 1145). Dokdo remained under the uninterrupted administration of the Joseon Kingdom until the reign of King Gojong (高宗 r. 1863-1907). This fact satisfies the condition for discovery and effective occupation that has a precedent in international law with regard to the

territorial rights to Clipperton Island and Eastern Greenland.

Meanwhile, the first Japanese document that mentions Dokdo is the *Onshu shicho gogi* (隱州視聽合記; Record of Observations in Oki Province), published in 1667, and the reference indirectly confirms Dokdo as belonging to Joseon. The Joseon Government maintained a “vacant island policy” (空島政策) with regard to Ulleungdo and Dokdo between 1417 and 1881 (to protect its subjects from attacks by Japanese pirates). The Japanese used this policy to back their claim that the islands were a no-man’s land and to seize control in 1905. However, the vacant island policy means withdrawal, not abandonment. Only in the latter case would the country’s sovereign rights be affected. The legal precedent can be found in the arbitration in the British-Portuguese dispute over Delagoa Bay in Mozambique in the late 19th century and in the ruling over Eastern Greenland in 1964. Since Korean liberation from Japan in 1945, Korean sovereignty over Dokdo is reaffirmed in the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations,

the MacArthur Line, the Rhee Line (or “Peace Line”), and Supreme Command for Allied Powers Instruction (SCAPIN) No. 677 (January 29, 1946) and No. 1033 (June 22, 1946).

However, the seeds of the current Dokdo dispute were sown by the lackadaisical attitude of Park Chung-hee’s military junta, blinded by the need for financial assistance during the Korea-Japan talks on establishing diplomatic relations in 1965. At the time, the Korean Government was unprepared to counter the Japanese demand for abolishment of the Peace Line, which extended 60 miles from Dokdo, the base point. The Korean side did not clearly assert that Korea had sovereignty over Dokdo.

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) went into force in 1994, and the following year the Japanese Diet voted in favor of territorial waters that extend 200 nautical miles (230 miles, 370 kilometers) from Japan’s shores and include Dokdo. In 1996, the Japanese announced an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that uses Dokdo as a base point, and two years later the

Japanese unilaterally abrogated the Korea-Japan Fisheries Agreement.

Korea quietly acquiesced to these developments, and in 1997 it unexpectedly announced an EEZ with Ulleungdo as the base point. Then Korea accepted a new fisheries agreement with Japan in 1999 and made the mistake of allowing Dokdo to be part of a jointly administered maritime zone. Article 15 states that the agreement has been made irrespective of territorial issues. At first glance, it seems that the claims to sovereign rights over Dokdo are to be dealt with separately, but the important fact remains that Japan already declared its EEZ with Dokdo as the base point in 1996. Thus, Article 15 tacitly agrees with that fact.

The maritime border was redrawn between Dokdo and Ulleungdo, separating the two, and Dokdo is now included in jointly administered waters. As a result, the exclusivity of Dokdo has been compromised, and Dokdo has steadily been transformed into an area of disagreement. In the past, Korean statesmen have lightly brushed aside abrupt statements by Japanese officials on

sovereign rights, labeling them as “preposterous remarks.” Instead of vehemently objecting, the Korean Government has remained low key, leading to the Japanese Ambassador’s audaciously declaring in the middle of the Korean capital that Takeshima belonged to Japan. The Korean Government’s response was to repeat a passive stopgap measure of summoning a diplomatic minister, instead of the Ambassador. Korea has resorted to “quiet diplomacy,” a hands-off approach to dealing with Japan, which wants to turn Dokdo into a dispute. The result has been acquiescence to Japanese claims to sovereignty over Dokdo, causing repercussions in international law.

Future resolution of the Dokdo issue must be pursued resolutely from the view of safeguarding Korean territory and sovereignty. Territory and sovereignty are necessary conditions for building international relations as a nation-state. The inability to exercise territoriality and sovereign rights effectively will impact the nation’s very existence.



A lighthouse and other facilities perched atop Dokdo.

In this connection, President Roh Moo-hyun’s stern measures against the Japanese survey ships and the follow-up talks on Dokdo have been appropriate. At the Russia-Japan summit talks in Tokyo (in 2005), President Putin would not concede an inch on the territory issue in the north, while gaining real economic benefits. Korea needs to pay attention to the Russian leader’s diplomacy. The new Korea-Japan Fisheries Agreement must quickly be scrapped, because it draws a borderline between Dokdo and Ulleungdo, separating the two and turning Dokdo into an area of dispute. We must remember the time when the U.K. and Argentina were at odds over the Falkland Islands. The British acted boldly and decisively, forcing the exercise of their sovereign rights and putting an end to the dispute. Korea needs to strengthen its alliance with the United States and maintain close diplomatic ties with China to curb the ambitions of the Japanese, who want to join the UN Security Council.

# TINY ISLETS, TITANIC ISSUE

**Yuri V. Vanin**

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Few countries are embroiled in as many territorial disputes with neighboring states as Japan is today. To the north of Japan, for example, the Japanese want to regain control of some of the Kuril Islands from the Russians. In the south, Japan controls the uninhabited Senkaku Islands (尖閣諸島), which are also claimed by the Chinese and Taiwanese.

The most intense dispute currently is over Dokdo (獨島), considered to be native soil by both Koreans. Japanese claims to the contrary have created a sharp diplomatic rift between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Many in Asia interpret Japan's claim on Dokdo (which they call Takeshima 竹島) as a manifestation of increasing Japanese expansionism, disavowal of Japan's militaristic past and whitewashing of history. The Koreans have voiced their concerns to this effect.

Dokdo is actually two tiny volcanic islets (plus some 90 rocky outcroppings) in the East Sea (or Sea of Japan, according to the Japanese). The East Islet reaches 98 meters above sea level,

while the West Islet stands 168 meters at its highest point. The rocky islets are about 150 meters apart and their combined area is less than 200,000 square meters. Korea's Ulleungdo (鬱陵島), at 87 kilometers away, is the closest parcel of land to Dokdo; the nearest Japanese possession is the Oki Islands (隱岐諸島), which are twice as distant.

Dokdo is too small to be of value in itself; it supports little plant life and is practically deserted. At first glance, one might wonder why such a fuss is being raised over its territorial status. Yet this past spring, the Dokdo dispute escalated once again into a crisis and Korean-Japanese relations were strained tremendously.

The Japanese as well as the Koreans, North and South, have produced documentary evidence from recent as well as ancient history to justify their claim to the islets. Koreans can produce various historic records as early as the sixth century to show that Dokdo belongs to them. Thus, they have a more convincing case than do the Japanese.

Dokdo is composed of dongdo and seodo.



© Kim Gwan-jung

The Japanese argument is based on the fact that they had control of the islets until 1945. The Japanese occupied Dokdo during the Russo-Japanese War, which erupted in February 1904. They then ruled all of Korea—the peninsula and the various islands—as a colony between 1910 and 1945. The Koreans have never to this day accepted the Japanese claim on Dokdo as being legitimate.

Korean sovereignty over the islets was restored in 1945, when Korea was liberated from Japanese rule. The Republic of Korea (ROK) Government was established in 1948, and it has maintained jurisdiction over Dokdo ever since. A special Dokdo Patrol Unit (獨島警備隊) is permanently stationed on the islets. The unit consists of 37 people, who not only have guard duties but also are responsible for building necessary structures on the islets. They use patrol boats to keep watch of the seas around the islets.

The Japanese claims of sovereign rights over Dokdo are certainly no simple yearning for past possessions. The Japanese consider the

islets important and have adopted a utilitarian approach to their claim. Dokdo boasts bountiful fishing grounds, and there is a strong chance of undersea energy reserves in the surrounding area.

Even more important, the Japanese can extend their 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) by possessing the islets. They could use Dokdo to keep a closer watch on the maritime movements of Korea and other neighboring countries, particularly the Russian Pacific Fleet. Thus, the islets have a strategic significance for the Japanese.

The Japanese are not only basing their claim on legal and historical grounds; they are also resorting to public displays. Take the latest flare-up in tensions for example.

February 2005 marked the 100th anniversary of Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War, and the occasion was used to commemorate the incorporation of Dokdo into Shimane Prefecture (島根縣) one hundred years prior. On March 15, 2005, the prefecture passed a law



declaring February 22 as “Takeshima Day,” and annual observances have been planned for that day in the future. On that occasion, the Japanese Ambassador to Korea held a press conference and suggested that Takeshima (Dokdo) was Japanese territory both legally and historically. The Korean Government and public have demanded a clarification from the Japanese side.

Recently, the Japanese Government dispatched research vessels to the waters around Dokdo to conduct a maritime survey and confer Japanese names on undersea features as if to say they were Japanese possessions. As dis-

cussed above, Japan's hidden agenda is not difficult to discern. On April 20, the Japanese survey ships entered the waters off Dokdo, but both Koreas protested vehemently. However, only stern measures by the ROK Government, including the dispatch of warships to the area, persuaded the Japanese to call off their provocation. A Korea-Japan conference opened in Seoul on April 22, and the rift was patched up, but the fact clearly remained that the two countries were far apart on Japan's expansionist designs.

This naturally prompted ROK President Roh Moo-hyon to issue a special public statement on Dokdo and Korean-Japanese relations on April 25. President Roh declared: “Dokdo is our land. It is not merely our land. It has a special historical meaning. Dokdo was the first territory of Korea to be seized in the course of Japan's usurpation of the Korean Peninsula. The Russo-Japanese War was a war of aggression that Imperial Japan initiated to secure control over the Korean Peninsula. Under the pretext of carrying out the War, Japan sent its troops to Korea and occupied



Korean Naval ships taking part in a drill around Dokdo

the Korean Peninsula.”

Concerning Japan’s current position, President Roh stated: “Japan’s present claim to Dokdo is tantamount to maintaining a right to what it had once occupied during an imperialist war of aggression and, what is worse, to reasserting colonial territorial rights of bygone years. This is an act of negating the complete liberation and independence of Korea. Moreover, this amounts to contending the legitimacy of Japan’s criminal history of waging wars of aggression and annihilation as well as forty years of exploitation, torture, imprisonment, forced labor, and even sexual slavery. This cannot be tolerated by any means.”

The ROK President forcefully added: “Physical provocations will be met with strong and firm responses... We will continue to muster every

measure of our national strength and diplomatic resources until the day when the Japanese Government remedies these wrongdoings. We will also undertake all other necessary measures. The nature of this matter is such that no compromise or surrender is possible, whatever the costs and sacrifices may be.”

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) also considers Dokdo to be sovereign Korean soil and completely rejects Japanese territorial claims to the islets. The North Koreans insist that ambitions of aggression and schemes for territorial expansion lie behind the Dokdo dispute and that Dokdo is just the first in a series of targets for the Japanese.

Recently, the DPRK Foreign Ministry issued a statement on the current Dokdo situation: “Japan’s claim to sovereign rights to Dokdo justi-

fies completely the DPRK decision to increase national defense capabilities, starting with nuclear deterrence, to ensure Korean Peninsular and Asian peace and security.”

It is very important to note that the two Koreas are in agreement on the Dokdo issue. Indeed, the Koreans can only protect the territory that has been handed down to them generation after generation if they work together. This example proves once again the importance of Korean reunification.

All the incidents surrounding Dokdo today also have direct repercussions on Russia. Dokdo is located close to the Russian Far East, and the Dokdo issue is sensitive insofar as it can affect Russian interests in the Pacific.

Despite the differences of opinion between the Koreans and the Japanese over Dokdo, the current situation is not likely to escalate into an armed conflict. Moreover, the United States would not allow the situation to deteriorate into an armed skirmish between its two close allies. No matter how the situation plays out, however,

the Russians have to give up their “wait-and-see” stance.

Of course, this does not mean Russia has to become involved in a conflict between the Koreans and the Japanese. However, they do have to take a stand and declare their position on the issue, as the Japanese were the ones that incited the current conflict. On the other hand, some powerful people in the Russian Government are now trying to curry favor with the Japanese by saying that Russia should concede three of the Kuril Islands to Japan. This means that it would not be easy for the Russians to elucidate their stance readily, but this writer hopes that they will come out in support of the Korean position. They have ample reason to do so. Dokdo truly is Korean soil, and the Koreans are now resisting a new colonial scheme of Japan. By supporting the Korean stance, the Russians can expect at the very least for the Koreans to indicate on their maps that the Kuril Archipelago is Russian territory.

# THE ROAD TO IRREDENTISM: WHO COVETS DOKDO?

**E. Vnykov**

Professor, The Russian Far East Institute

Professor Vnykov obtained his PhD. in philosophy from the Irkutsk State University in 1968 and served as a member of the Soviet and Russian Parliament between 1989 and 1992. He is now professor and head researcher at the Russian Far East Institute.

The Dokdo issue has recently caused Korean-Japanese relations to deteriorate sharply, and the situation has even prompted Korea to dispatch more naval vessels to the area.

The current Dokdo flap was sparked by the Shimane Prefecture in March 2005, when it declared February 22 as “Takeshima Day” (the Japanese name for Dokdo). Japan is not a federal state that allows the provinces a free rein; rather the central government has the power to negate any legislation passed by a local assembly. The central government did not respond in any way to the provocative legislation passed by the Shimane Prefecture. Such inaction is tantamount to implicit and explicit approval to the Shimane decision. This same attitude was shown in February 2005, when the Japanese Ambassador to Korea stated, “Dokdo is Japanese territory historically and legally.”


In April 2006, the Japanese Government decided to dispatch two vessels to conduct hydrographic surveys of the waters around Dokdo. The ships were sent in advance of submitting an offi-

cial request to the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) to name the undersea area between Ulleungdo and Dokdo as “Tsushima Basin.” The registration is to suggest that Dokdo and Japan have some kind of relationship.


Japanese and some Russian journalists have suggested that Dokdo is the object of a territorial dispute. However, the fact remains that Dokdo historically and legally belongs to Korea. There is no doubt that Dokdo was held by Korea throughout the Joseon period (1392-1910) as well as the preceding Goryeo and Three Kingdoms periods.

Dokdo, which is located at a latitude of 37° 14' north and a longitude of 131° 52' east, consists of two islets surrounded by 89 assorted boulders and reefs.

International Maritime Law does not allow a country to claim possession of deserted rocks sticking out of the sea. However, the proscription does not apply to Dokdo, which has a total area of 187,453 square meters. The West Islet is 95,000 square meters in area and 168.5 meters above sea level at its highest point, while the East Islet



- 1 The undersea features of Dokdo indicate that the island sits atop a massive table mount with a base diameter of 25 kilometers and height of 2,000 meters. Source: Korea Ocean Research and Development Institute.
- 2 A geological map of Dokdo showing numerous fault lines throughout the island's land mass.



**Royaume de Coree (Map of the Korean Kingdom) by France's D'Anville**  
 This is the 31st map in the 42-map atlas titled *Nouvel Atlas de la Chine* compiled by Jean-Baptiste d'Anville (1697-1782) in 1734. While introducing Korea as an independent kingdom to the Western world for the first time, this map set the standard for Korea's geographic features on maps. On this map, Ulleungdo and Dokdo are called Fan-ling-tau and Tchian-chan-tau respectively. Dokdo is located closer to the mainland than is Ulleungdo. It conveys the Korean public's age-old geographic awareness that these two islands are Korean territory.

Source: Collection of Kyunghee University's Hye-jung Museum

has an area of 65,000 square meters and reaches an elevation of 99.4 meters. Korean Maritime Police have been stationed on the islets since 1954.

The strait between the two islets is between 110- and 160-meters wide and three- to ten-meters deep. Administratively, the islets are part of Ulleungdo, which belongs to Gyeongsangbuk-do (province). Ulleungdo, the closest island to Dokdo, is 87 kilometers away and Dokdo is visible from Ulleungdo on a clear day. The two islets are close together and their total area is not extensive; they are collectively called Dokdo. The closest Japanese territory to Dokdo is the Oki Islands, which are 160 kilometers distant. Dokdo is not visible from the Oki Islands because of the earth's curvature.

The distinguished Korean historian and statesman Kim Busik (1075-1151) compiled the *Samguksagi* (三國史記 History of the Three Kingdoms) in 1145. This text refers to



Dokdo and Ulleungdo as a small kingdom called Usanguk (于山國) that was made part of the Silla Kingdom (新羅 57 BCE-935 CE) in 512. Thus, Dokdo was often referred to as "Usando" (于山島) until the end of the 19th century.

Korean maps compiled in 1432, 1481, 1531 and 1808 all include Usando (Dokdo) with Ulleungdo, and they are represented as being the same size. A map of Korea that was printed in France in 1737 depicts Ulleungdo and Dokdo as Korean territory. The map also indicates that they are in Korean waters, and Dokdo is actually positioned closer to the Korean Peninsula than Ulleungdo is.

Dokdo was occupied and Ulleungdo plundered during the Hideyoshi Invasion of Korea (1592-1598), and the island inhabitants suffered greatly as a result. Historically, the cruelty of the Japanese invaders was notorious. In fact, the legacy of their barbarous acts remains today. Mimizuka 耳塚, or Ear Mound, was built in Kyoto to glorify the exploits of the Japanese invaders and pirates committed for centuries up to and includ-

ing the Hideyoshi Invasion. This unique, grisly monument enshrines the ears and noses of approximately 38,000 Koreans killed during the invasions.

The Joseon Court ordered the islanders to evacuate to the mainland to prevent their annihilation. The evacuation left the island deserted, and Japan attempted to control the area for about one hundred years after the war, during which Japanese fishing boats surreptitiously operated in the waters off Ulleungdo and Dokdo. However, the Koreans repeatedly demanded that the Japanese keep their fishermen off the islands. Finally in January 1696, the Tokugawa government confirmed that Ulleungdo and Dokdo were part of Korean territory and rescinded permission for Japanese fishermen to work in the area.

The first Japanese cartography to include Dokdo was issued in 1667. That map labels Ulleungdo as Takeshima (竹島 "Bamboo Island," later used by the Japanese to refer to Dokdo) and Dokdo as Matsushima (松島 "Pine Island"). Both locations are indicated as part of sovereign Korean



**Dokdo absent in old Japanese maps**  
 Japanese-Korean Professor Yuji Hosaka of Sejong University in Seoul unveiled in June 2005 three old Japanese maps of the Edo period (1600-1868). All these maps, published by the Japanese Government in 1665, 1702 and 1717 respectively from the top, did not include Dokdo. Source: Yonhap News




included a Prime Minister and a Foreign Minister. The Japanese Foreign Ministry then conducted studies on the sovereignty of Dokdo and Ulleungdo and concluded that the island and islets belonged to Korea. These findings were included in *Nihon gaiko bunsho* (Japanese Diplomatic Documents) Vol. III, Item 6, Document 87, dated April 15, 1870. This volume was published in 1930.

In 1876 the Japanese Interior Ministry ordered the compilation of new maps for each prefecture and a new land register. The Shimane Prefecture authorities asked the Japanese Interior Ministry for help in clarifying the status of Ulleungdo and Dokdo. The Ministry studied the issue for five months and concluded that the island and islets were Korean possessions. Considering the importance of the issue at the time, the Interior Ministry asked the Prime Minister to make the final ruling. The documents presented by the Prime Minister were examined carefully, and Korean sovereignty over Ulleungdo and Dokdo was reconfirmed on March 20, 1877.

Meanwhile, on April 9, 1870 the Interior

territory, and the Oki Islands (隠岐諸島) are depicted as the northwest maritime border between Korea and Japan. Japanese military scholar Shihei Hayashi (林子平 1738-1793) compiled the *Sangoku setsujozu* (三國接壤之圖 Map of Three Adjoining Countries), which was published in 1785. The map marks the territories of Korea in yellow and those of Japan in green. Dokdo and Ulleungdo are both presented in yellow, and the map explicitly states that they are Korean possessions.

With the Meiji Restoration (明治維新) in 1868, a new leadership was installed in Japan, which



Map used by the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers in 1946 that indicates the Japanese and Korean areas of administrative jurisdiction following the end of World War II. Ulleungdo Island and Dokdo are clearly identified as part of Korea's area of jurisdiction.

In this map, the East Sea is erroneously depicted as Sea of Japan. Notwithstanding, Dokdo is clearly demarcated as Korean territory by a solid line.

Source: Collection of Dokdo Museum



Ministry sent official instructions to Shimane Prefecture to remove Ulleungdo and Dokdo from its maps because they were Korean possessions.

Korean people began to resettle Ulleungdo in the late 19th century. Most of the settlers were from the Southwest (present-day Jeolla provinces), the poorest region on the peninsula. The East and West Islets of Dokdo are nothing but rock, and no one had lived there up to that time. Therefore, the settlers began to call it "Doldo" (Rock Island), and the Southwestern dialect pronunciation was "Dokdo." That is how

today's name came to be.

ROK President Roh Moo-hyun pointed out the facts in a public statement on April 25, 2006: The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 was a war of aggression in which the Japanese Imperial Government aimed to take control of Korea. The Japanese occupied Dokdo and used the islets for military purposes, namely to keep Russian warships out of the area.

When the Japanese were defeated at the end of the Second World War, Korea regained its independence. The Supreme Command for Allied



Powers Instruction (SCAPIN) No. 677 was issued on January 29, 1946, returning Jeju, Ulleungdo, and Dokdo to Korean hands. Then SCAPIN No. 1033 was issued on June 26 of that year, prohibiting Japanese ships and crew from entering the 12-nautical-mile seas off Dokdo, reconfirming that the islets are part of Korea's sovereign territory.

In June 1950, the UN forces and the U.S. Pacific Air Force Command established the Korea Air Defense Identification Zone (KADIZ), and Dokdo is included in that sector rather than in the Japan Air Defense Identification Zone (JADIZ). KADIZ is still in effect today.

The above issues support President Roh's April 25 statement that Dokdo is not just Korean land but carries a special historical significance.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty (between the Allied Powers and Japan) restricts Japanese control to just Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Okinawa. Japan is a signatory of this treaty, which stipulates that the Japanese cannot legally claim any territory beyond the above four regions.

Japanese claims to Dokdo can be interpreted

as a violation of its international obligations as is the case in any claim to the Kuril Islands (Russian), Senkaku Islands/Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚臺群島; Chinese) and the Paracel Islands (Vietnamese).

Moreover, Korea established a Maritime Police unit on Dokdo in 1954, and the Japanese did not respond in any way to that move at the time.

Japan's claim over territory held by neighboring countries ignores legal and political settlements negotiated at the end of World War II. Such moves disregard the freedom and rights of other countries, including Korea, and manifest irredentist behavior. Who will believe that Japan is truly seeking peace in East Asia?

The situation boils down to the meaning of maritime borders and exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Dokdo is within Korea's 200-mile EEZ, as is the area to the east and south of Ulleungdo. Currently, Japan is seeking to incorporate Dokdo into its territory to expand its EEZ to the waters between Ulleungdo and Dokdo and increase the area for its fishing industry. At present, only a limited number of Japanese vessels can enter the

**Samgoku setsujozu (The Complete Map of Three Adjoining Countries)**

In 1832, J.Klaproth from Germany copied "A Complete Map of Three Adjoining Countries" by the Japanese scholar, Shihei Hayashi. The observation, "Takenosima a la Coree," which is written next to Dokdo means "Dokdo is Korean territory" It clarifies that Dokdo belongs to Korea. Klaproth also colored Ulleungdo and Dokdo in yellow, the same color he used for the Korean Peninsula. Source: Collection of Seoul Museum of History



area, after obtaining Korean Government permission, to harvest fish and other marine resources.

The Japanese attempt to expand its EEZ is not only a scheme for snatching Korean territory. It is a ploy for taking fish and other marine life as well as natural resources under the seabed in the vicinity of Dokdo.

There has been a controversy as well over the name of the body of water between Korea and Japan. "Sea of Korea" and "East Sea" had already appeared on Russian and Western European maps in the 17th through 19th centuries. "Sea of Japan" did not gain currency until the end of the 19th century. Recently, the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) suggested that the names "East Sea" and "Sea of Japan" be used concurrently.

Gas production has begun in the East Sea, and chances are excellent that



An officer of the Japanese Imperial Army making remarks before Korean draftees. (L)

Under a banner depicting the Rising Sun and war efforts, the Japanese colonial government forced young and old Koreans to harvest grains to be used for its military campaign during World War II. (R)



offshore oilfields will also be found. Japan has been trying to block Korean attempts to submit the name “Ulleungdo Basin” for the undersea area between Dokdo and Ulleungdo. The nation that acquires the future name for the basin will be positioned to provide the documentation that accurately describes the hydrographic features. Legally and practically, Japan cannot possess Dokdo, a fact that has prevented it from conducting hydrographic surveys. Anyway, Japan, knowing that Korea is ready to apply for registering Korean-style names with the IHO, dispatched its own survey vessels to the area.

Sovereignty claims by irredentist elements in Japan do not stop with Dokdo. For example, Japan referred to Ulleungdo as “Takeshima” in the 16th and 17th centuries. If they manage to have Dokdo fall into their clutches, their next target would be Ulleungdo.

Why, then, is Japan exhibiting such provocative behavior at this time?

The economic value of Dokdo has been alluded to above. Besides the islets’ economic benefits,

the Japanese Government eyes substantial political gains both domestically and internationally. The Japanese perpetrated mass killings of civilians (on a scale comparable to Nazi Germany) and numerous other crimes against humanity in Korea, China, Russia and Southeast Asia between the start of the 20th century and the end of World War II. The Government now wants to bury these atrocities.

The Japanese authorities have verbally apologized to neighboring countries repeatedly about the past. Yet, the Government attempts to justify the dark side of its history. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has continued publicly to pay homage at Yasukuni Shrine, which honors among its war dead persons who were judged to be Class A war criminals by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal at the end of World War II. Moreover, history textbooks used in Japanese schools whitewash the Japanese military record in Asia, and the Government refuses to acknowledge its involvement in trafficking sex slaves (“comfort women”) for the military. The attempts to abolish Article 9 of the

Constitution, which proscribes war and military rearmament, are sufficient to show the emptiness of the Japanese apologies to its neighbors.

The Japanese behavior should be compared with that of Germany and the German people after their defeat in World War II. The Germans did not extol the criminal behavior of their wartime leaders or cherish the memory of criminal organizations. The Germans lost some of their sovereign territory in the wake of World War II, but they have not tried to make irredentist claims to that land. Germany has also banned pro-Nazi activities and the use of Nazi paraphernalia.

Why hasn’t Japan enacted the same kinds of policies that Germany has? The answer lies in a lack of political and ethical will to atone for past mistakes and repent sincerely for brutal military behavior in the past.

As President Roh Moo-hyun pointed out, Japan does not need to apologize any more. Instead, it must take concrete steps to show its will to put the past to rest satisfactorily.

Japanese territorial claims over Dokdo also

harbor a hidden domestic political agenda. Japan’s ruling party is one of the world’s staunchest anti-labor regimes and is now leaning toward the political right to maintain power. The party is garnering public support through its effort to reclaim lands under the pretext that they were illegally seized by neighboring countries.

However, Japan was an ally of Nazi Germany during World War II, and it must bear a political responsibility for its past actions. Japan must not forget that historical reparations must be made for a long time into the future.

For example, Japan now has the world’s second largest economy yet remains a small player politically. For this reason, Japan will have trouble in joining the UN Security Council, a position it has long wanted.

Prime Minister Koizumi’s term ends in the fall of 2006. Japanese politicians, including Koizumi, are trying to curry the public’s favor ahead of the next election. In the process, the Korea-Japan issue could be used to stoke the fires of Japanese nationalism.

Japanese leaders know that provoking Russia or trying to incite public hysteria is not in their interest. Russian President Vladimir Putin will not idly ignore behavior that runs against Russia's national interests. He will not hesitate to use the appropriate measures within the bounds of reason.

The Russian political elite today, as ever, will not tolerate encroachment on Russian rights under any circumstances. China is no different. What were perceived as Japanese insults toward China in 2004 and 2005 were met with public outrage. Japan sees Korea, with its complex domestic situation, as the weakest target in the neighborhood.

However, Japan has erred once again. Its maneuvering has been met with a prompt and unified resistance from the Korean people and the President. In President Roh's words, Korea will never cede Dokdo, no matter what the sacrifice. He went on to say that Japan's reevaluation of its history is a precondition for the furthering of cooperation with Korea. Those words were fully sup-

ported by all Koreans and Korean political parties. North Korea also criticized the Japanese claims over Dokdo and even offered to help the South Koreans in this matter.

This writer believes that Russia will not take lightly any Japanese claims of sovereignty over territory belonging to its neighbors. Collective countermeasures are needed against Japanese irredentism. All nations involved in territorial disputes with the Japanese must work together to get the Japanese irredentists to give up their desire to repeat past criminal behavior.

Ironically, this nation with its irredentist propensity wants to be a standing member of the UN Security Council. However, any country with irredentist claims past or present must be stopped from serving on the Council. Japan must give up its designs on neighboring countries' sovereign soil and stop trying to justify its aggression against other Asian countries during World War II. Only then should the consent be made for it to become a Council member.

Life on Dokdo  
A resident of Dokdo putting postcards into a mailbox.



# FACING THE PAST TO WIN THE FUTURE

**Gebhard Hielscher**  
German freelance journalist

Gebhard Hielscher is a German specialist in East Asian issues and served as the Far East correspondent for *Süddeutschen Zeitung*, a German daily newspaper, for 30 years from 1971. He is now a freelance journalist in Japan.

**W**orld War II had two main perpetrators, Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia. It seems natural that both countries are often compared, also in regard to how they handled the aftermath of that war. Some of these comparisons are quite convincing, others not so. Starting from the premise that only comparable things should be compared, I would like to sort out some elements where Japan and Germany differ significantly before proceeding to point out significant differences in their postwar behavior.

## The Incomparables

To begin with the obvious and uncontroversial—political geography: Japan is an island nation; Germany is situated in the middle of a continent. If Germany wanted to be accepted again by its European neighbors, it had to come to terms with its past behavior in a way acceptable to these neighbors. In contrast, Japan felt it could disregard its neighbors and run away from its past for a long time, because America protected it anyway.

The Holocaust: Japan has plenty to account for, but it certainly did not commit anything comparable to the systematic, state-organized and immensely cruel mass murder of millions of Jews in Germany and German-occupied parts of Europe. Therefore it is unfair and inappropriate to compare German efforts—to at least symbolically and financially express remorse for what Germans did to the Jews by paying compensation to survivors and their families or supporting the state of Israel—with anything Japan did or did not do with regard to victims of Japanese misdeeds.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The A-bomb was originally developed to be used against Germany, but when it was ready for use in July 1945, Hitler's so-called Third Reich had already collapsed, and Germany had ceased to exist as a state. The shocking damage caused by the two bombs dropped on Japan was so terrifying that many Japanese began to think of themselves as victims of a crime against humanity—conveniently forgetting the crimes committed by their countrymen against fellow Asians and others.<sup>1</sup>

The Defeat: Germany capitulated in May 1945. On the 23rd of that month, the Allied Powers deposed the last government of the Third Reich. Germany ceased to exist, was divided into four occupation zones and ruled directly by the four Allies—the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union. Exactly four years later the Federal Republic of Germany (so-called West Germany) was established on the territories of the three western zones with Bonn as its provisional capital, to be followed a week later by the founding of the German Democratic Republic (so-called East Germany) on the territory of the Soviet occupation zone with East Berlin as its capital. After four years of discontinuity Germany had reappeared as two rival states, which unified into one Germany 41 years later in October 1990.

In contrast, Japan, which had capitulated in a two-stage process on August 15 (radio speech of the Emperor) and September 2, 1945 (signing of the surrender documents), continued as a state, the Tenno remained as emperor, and the

government stayed in office. The country was not divided, and the sole occupation power, the United States of America, ruled only indirectly until Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952. The keyword to describe the early postwar period, in comparison to Germany, would be continuity.

## The Comparables:

After sorting out these major differences, there remain three large areas open to comparison—the wars of aggression by the armed forces of Germany and Japan against other countries, their policy and actions in occupied or colonized territories, and finally war crimes in the narrow legal sense, meaning crimes that go beyond what are considered “normal” war activities. The following examples show how Japan and Germany differed in dealing with these war-related issues after the war.

**Example 1** The prosecution of war crimes. The Allied Powers conducted war crimes trials against both Germans (in Nuremberg) and

A copy of the controversial Japanese textbook, "New History Textbook," published by Fusosha is seen on the shelf of the Japan Textbook Research Center in Tokyo Friday, June 3, 2005. After the nationalist textbook was approved by the Japanese Government, it enraged China, South Korea and other Asian neighbors. Critics say the textbook glosses over Japanese wartime atrocities. © Yonhap News



Japanese (in Tokyo). But in the same year of 1958, when the Japanese Government ordered the release of the last inmates of Sugamo prison who had been sentenced by the Tokyo Trial, Germany set up in the town of Ludwigsburg a Center for Investigating National Socialist Crimes. The Ludwigsburg Center is still operating to this day, it has initiated criminal proceedings against more than 100,000 suspects of whom about 6,500 were given guilty verdicts—German courts passing sentences on German nationals who committed severe war-related crimes. In contrast, Japanese prosecutors and criminal courts have not pursued any cases against Japanese suspects—and not for lack of suspects, but because of a lack of willingness. Even the commander of the notorious “Unit 731,” which operated camps in occupied China where approximately 3,000 inmates died cruel deaths, many in inhumane “medical experiments” not unlike those conducted in German concentration camps, could live out his life, even reopen a medical practice under his real name, unperturbed by

any challenge from criminal investigators or prosecutors. In my opinion this is one of the darkest and most shameful chapters in the post-war history of Japan’s legal system. The lack of any action by Japan’s policymakers to, for instance, prolong the terms of the statute of limitation at least for the most heinous crimes to keep open the possibilities for prosecution puts into question the moral integrity of the political establishment.

**Example 2** The treatment of the prewar period and the wartime history in history textbooks for schools. Educational reconciliation through international textbook research between teachers and historians from former enemy countries had already been tried after World War I between France and Germany—though, in the end, with limited success—and was resumed after World War II (already in 1949 between British and West German teachers, from 1950 on between French and West German experts). In Germany these efforts were later centered around the Georg

Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research (GEI) in Braunschweig. In the words of its current director, Wolfgang Hoepken, an early goal of the institute was “to eliminate, through collaboration with international partners, the hostile images and negative stereotyping of other people and countries, which early textbooks had promoted...Its basic intention was the ‘decontamination’ of textbooks and historic concepts that had been poisoned by nationalistic misuse of history...it understood its task...as one of educational reconciliation and contribution toward conflict prevention.”

Hoepken describes the German-French textbook consultations since the 1950s and the consultations between Germany and Poland in the 1970s as “cases of successful textbook ‘decontamination’ ...greatly encouraged by the consensus that had been achieved within German society, according to which the legacies of World War II and Nazism presented Germany with certain moral obligations...The goal of such textbook consultations was the achievement of

an agreement on one historical narrative in which both sides would be able to recognize themselves.”

Hoepken in November 2001 participated in a symposium<sup>2</sup> on textbook problems jointly organized by American and German foundations in Tokyo, which was also attended by experts from France, Poland, the Netherlands and Italy as well as the United States, Japan and South Korea. The discussion of U.S. textbook issues resulting from World War II—such as the use of atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki or the forced internment of U.S. citizens of Japanese descent after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941—by American experts effectively countered an excuse frequently used by those Japanese denying the need for textbook reconciliation in Asia—by claiming that only nations which lost the war had to deal with these issues and that Japan, which unlike Germany did not commit a holocaust, had nothing to atone for because it only conducted a “normal” war, like the victorious Allies. Textbook reconciliation experts from



*Laus crassirostris*

Dokdo Island, home to some 60 varieties of plant life, is a favorite nesting grounds for black-tailed gulls, streaked shearwaters, Swinhoe's fork-tailed petrels, and other seabirds.



*Maiden Pink* (*Dianthus superbus* var. *longicalycinus*)

Japan and South Korea participating in that symposium demonstrated that goodwill and appropriate self-reflection can produce impressive results, even friendship. But that could not make up for the fact that their exchanges were essentially “private,” lacking effective political support in both countries. I know too little about South Korean history school textbooks to express an opinion on them. However, I have been following Japanese history textbooks for middle and high schools since the early 1970s. In those days most of them didn’t even mention the Nanking massacre of 1937 in the main text, only a few had footnotes referring to the “Nanking (Nanjing) incident” without much explanation. There were some improvements after widespread protests in the early 1980s, but the total picture presented in these texts was still far from convincing. And since the late 1990s a renewed effort at whitewashing the responsibilities for Japan’s militaristic and colonial adventures in Asia gained attention culminating in the “New History Textbook” published by the so-called Tsukuru

Kai (the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform) in 2001. Alarm bells rang when the Ministry of Education included it on the list of books the local education committees could choose from. Hardly any did, but the controversy gave the book a lot of publicity and many readers among the general public.

**Example 3** Reparation and compensation policies. War damage settlements between states are usually referred to as “reparations” whereas individuals claiming war-related damages would be seeking “compensation.” Both Germany and Japan had to pay very substantial “reparations in kind” through confiscation of various properties and assets held at home or abroad. There does not seem to exist a comprehensive comparison of the value of the assets confiscated by the Allied Powers. But if there was, as seems likely, any significant difference in the value of assets confiscated from Germany and Japan, this was due to different confiscation policies of the Allies, not of Germany or Japan.

### Lost Territories

Another type of “reparations in kind” occurred with regard to territories taken away from Germany and Japan after their defeat. Here a very significant gap exists both between the scale of territories taken away from the two defeated countries and the policies which Germany and Japan adopted regarding these “lost territories” after regaining sovereignty.

In discussing the justification or validity of these territorial losses, I think, a distinction should be made between territories acquired as part of more recent expansionist policies and the traditional territory of Germany and Japan. A comparable—and, I believe, reasonable—dividing line to distinguish between these two types of territories could be the almost parallel process of reorganizing both countries into modern nation-states, beginning, in the case of Japan, with the Meiji Reforms of 1868, and, in the case of Germany, with the proclamation of the new German Empire (Deutsches Reich) in January 1871. It is my opinion

that both countries should accept as “fait accompli” the loss of any territories acquired after that dividing line. And I would include in this category those island rocks called Dokdo in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese—and currently once again at the center of a territorial dispute between the Republic of Korea and Japan—because I haven’t seen any convincing proof that they clearly belonged to Japan before they were declared part of Shimane Prefecture in 1905.

Regarding the loss of traditional territory, Germany was treated much more severely than Japan. It lost almost a quarter of its traditional territory—24 percent or 114,000 square kilometers to be exact<sup>3</sup>—to Poland and the Soviet Union. And these huge territorial losses were made final, when Germany later recognized its new Eastern borders, the so-called “Oder-Neisse-Line,” as legally binding and valid. This recognition came in a three-step-process beginning in 1950, when Communist East Germany recognized its border with Communist Poland as permanent, and ending in November 1990 with a treaty between



In 1785, Shihei Hayashi, one of the leading geographers in Japan at that time, made a map showing the eight provinces of Joseon (Korea). In this map, Ulleungdo and Dokdo are indicated as one big island of Usanguk, Joseon, shown in the red circle.  
 Source: Collection of Kim Moon-gil, Professor at Pusan University of Foreign Studies

reunified Germany and the Republic of Poland confirming their existing border. But the most controversial and difficult step was the acceptance of the new borderline along the rivers of Oder and Neisse by West Germany in 1970/72. The so-called “Eastern Treaties” (*Ostvertraege* in German) with Moscow and Warsaw containing this acceptance were the centerpiece of the détente policy towards Eastern Europe (*Ostpolitik*) promoted by Chancellor Willy Brandt, a Social Democrat (SPD). Brandt wanted to complete in the East the postwar reconciliation between Germany and its wartime enemies,

which had been started vis-à-vis the West by former Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, a Christian Democrat (CDU), in the 1950s. The CDU and its Bavarian sister CSU, with the support of many refugees from the formerly German territories in the East, were bitterly opposed to the “Eastern Treaties.” They even tried to unseat the government by introducing a no-confidence motion in parliament. The motion was barely defeated, and the two treaties, which had been signed in August and December 1970, were finally passed, with a very small margin, in May 1972. In subsequent general elections Brandt’s SPD became the

strongest party signaling broad support for the *Ostpolitik*. And in 1990, it was another CDU chancellor, Helmut Kohl, who put his signature to the treaty recognizing the border with Poland, and thus finally accepting the Oder-Neisse-Line.

Let me add a personal note: Relinquishing these vast territories in the East, which for centuries had been part of Germany, implied the loss of their homeland for almost 10 million Germans—including myself. I was born in 1935 in the German city of Tilsit in East Prussia, which was also the hometown of my mother; it is now called Sovietsk and is part of the Russian district of Kaliningrad, the former Königsberg. My father’s birthplace was a village in the former German province of Silesia (“Schlesien” in German), which now belongs to Poland. So both of my parental homes have ceased to be German in the name of reconciliation. But I accept these losses as a way of paying at least part of Germany’s moral debt to Russia and Poland for the terrible suffering caused by German aggression, occupation and—in the

case of Poland—also colonization.

Traditionally Japanese territories taken away in 1945 and not returned later are now limited to the case of the so-called “Northern Territories,” consisting of the three islands of Kunashiri, Etorofu and Shikotan and the Habomai Group of small islands. Together all these islands measure less than 5,000 square kilometers or about 1.3 percent of Japan’s total territory, and their prewar population was minimal (less than 20,000). Compared to the 24.3 percent of traditional German territory (with a prewar population of 9.6 million people) lost since 1945, Japan’s loss of these northern islands looks minimal indeed. Moscow has offered to return the smaller islands (Shikotan and the Habomai Group) under certain conditions, but Tokyo does not want to settle for that. As a result, even 60 years after the end of the war, Russia and Japan have yet to conclude a peace treaty (diplomatic relations were resumed in 1956). A real compromise in this dispute would center around the question what to do with the two bigger islands—

Kunashiri, which is closer to Japan, and Etorofu, which is more than twice as large, but further away—and probably would have Japan regain the former and Russia keep the latter. But neither Tokyo nor Moscow currently seem able to muster the political strength and flexibility needed for such a “grand deal.”

### Financial Reparations

As for financial reparations, it is not true—as is often presumed—that Japan paid no war reparations at all. In fact, six Asian states and one European country did receive straightforward reparation payments from Japan: Burma (Myanmar), the Philippines, Indonesia and (South) Vietnam as well as Singapore and Malaysia; the European state was the Netherlands which was paid a lump sum of reparations for damages incurred by Dutch citizens during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, then a Dutch colony. But the two countries that suffered most from Japanese aggression—China—and colonization—Korea—did not receive any “reparations” from

Japan, only “economic cooperation.” Japan at the time could get away with this for various reasons: In the case of China, neither the Nationalist Government in Taipei nor the Communist Government in Peking participated in the San Francisco Peace Conference. And when Taipei negotiated with Tokyo about establishing diplomatic relations, Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek gave up all claims for reparations and compensation against Japan because he wanted to have Tokyo as an ally in his struggle against Mao Tse-tung’s Communists for the control of China; and when Japan broke with Taipei and established diplomatic relations with Mao’s People’s Republic, Tokyo could point to the precedent of the renunciation of all claims against Japan by the Nationalists then representing China, to avoid any war-related claims from Peking (Beijing). In the case of Korea, Seoul had demanded participation in the Peace Conference at San Francisco, but was turned down. And in its lengthy negotiations with Japan about establishing relations, it at first vigorously demanded reparations and compensation



Mr. Kim Sung-do, a resident of Dokdo, docking his boat.

from Tokyo, but after fourteen years of inconclusive negotiations Seoul finally caved in and also settled for “economic cooperation” because it needed the money.

### Individual Compensation

With regard to compensation claims by individuals (or other non-state entities), Germany and Japan went in opposite directions. While Japan, as a matter of principle, did not recognize any war-related claims by individuals against the state, (West) Germany already in the 1950s enacted broad legislation that established compensation claims against the German Government for a wide range of individuals who had been persecuted by the Nazi regime “for reasons of political opposition against national socialism or because of race, religion or ideology” (quoted from paragraph 1 of the Federal Compensation Law of 1953/56, in German “*Bundesentschädigungsgesetz*” or BEG). The BEG covered the whole period of Nazi rule from 1933 until the end of the war and provided fairly comprehensive compensation

to victims of Nazi violence “who had suffered damage to life, body, health, freedom, property, professional career or economic livelihood” (paragraph 1 BEG). Though the main thrust of the law was to compensate Jewish Nazi victims—which, as stated above, should not be used for comparison with Japan—the point I want to make here is that the BEG also applied to non-Jewish individuals who had suffered damage from Nazi violence for political, religious or ideological reasons.

One area where the differences in handling individual claims against the state are particularly striking is forced labor. While Japanese courts have awarded compensation claims against Japanese companies for making use of forced labor, they have upheld the Government’s rigorous position of refusing to pay any compensation, though it was the state that forcefully recruited the laborers and offered them to these companies. As for Germany, already the BEG provided for state compensation to former forced laborers who had suffered this fate because of persecu-



Korean “comfort women” (sex slaves for the Japanese army during the World War II) being forcibly drafted from Jeollabuk-do (province), Korea. (L)

Many unmarried Korean women were forced against their will to provide sexual services in military brothels in Japanese-occupied countries during World War II. (R)



tion for racial, political, religious or other reasons mentioned in that law. In addition to the BEG, the German parliament in July 2000 enacted a law establishing the foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future” (in German: *die Stiftung “Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft”*), financed jointly by the Government and industry, to provide compensation to people, mostly from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, who had been forced to work in wartime Germany. The law was enacted with broad support of all parties represented in parliament: The Lower House or Bundestag passed it with a large majority, the Upper House or Bundesrat unanimously. It was an expression of the political will to come to terms with the past and pay—something—for it.

The number of foreign workers in wartime Germany peaked in 1944 at 7.6 million men and women, and by that time they would be “mainly forced labor.”<sup>4</sup> Applications for compensation were expected from an estimated 1.5 million victims. The German fund was capped at an overall

amount of 10 billion DM, which would translate into about 5.1 billion Euro. The fund money was to be shared 50:50 between the Government and industry, at least in nominal terms. In reality, the Government’s share was much larger because industry could claim tax deductions for their payments into the fund. There was no political controversy about the use of tax money to compensate former forced laborers.

From this sum of 10 billion DM, 1 billion would have to be subtracted for certain insurance policy damages and 0.7 billion DM for “future fund” activities, leaving a net total of 8.3 billion DM or 4.25 billion euro for actual payments of forced labor compensation.<sup>5</sup>

During multilateral negotiations that preceded the establishment of this German foundation, it was agreed that the individual compensation payments for the aggravated form of forced labor—so-called slave labor—should be three times the basic amount. I mention this because slave labor, in my view, would be the link to the issue of the so-called 従軍慰安婦, or military

“comfort women” who were forced to provide sexual services in Japan’s military brothels during the war. The fate which these women, many of them from Korea, suffered at the hands of Japan’s military during the war was sexual slavery and therefore can be considered a particularly degrading form of slave labor.

Providing the former “comfort women” with some form of public “atonement money” for their suffering is the only case in which the Government of Japan at least tried to overcome its own principle of not compensating individuals for the forced labor they had to provide. This, too, was done through a special foundation set up in 1995 and called the “Asian Women’s Fund” (アジア女性基金 in Japanese; the formal name is much longer—女性のためのアジア平和国民基金—and could be translated as The People’s Asian Peace Fund for Women). The Asian Women’s Fund was established in July 1995 by prominent citizens who were concerned about the continued suffering of the former “comfort women,” victims by Japanese military during the Second World War,

with the support of the Government of Japan. The primary aim of the Fund is to extend atonement and support to those victimized women.”<sup>6</sup>

Setting up the Asian Women’s Fund in Japan was very controversial. Originally the Government had refused to accept any responsibility for the use of “comfort women” in military brothels, as Tokyo continues to do in other cases of forced labor including slave labor. Some conservative politicians made quite outrageous statements, denouncing these women as prostitutes because they were providing sex for money, to justify their opposition to any compensation payments from the Government. But early in 1993, a Japanese professor, doing research on the issue in the Defense Agency’s archives, discovered proof linking Japan’s military—and thus the state—to the recruitment of the women and to the administration of the military brothels. This prompted the then Miyazawa Cabinet to start their own investigation. And in August 1993, Cabinet spokesman Yohei Kono (河野洋平官房長官, the current president of the Lower House) admitted in a



Elderly Korean women who were victimized by Japan's military sexual slavery during the colonial rule rallying in protest against the Japanese Government's refusal to take any responsibility for its past atrocities. This demonstration is staged every Wednesday morning in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul. © Yonhap News

Government statement that these women had in fact been recruited by force (in Japanese: “*Kyosei Renko*” 強制連行), and apologized on behalf of the Government (in Japanese “*Owabi to Hansei*” おわびと反省).<sup>7</sup>

But even thereafter resistance against any official compensation was strong. The foundation finally set up in July 1995 under the Murayama Cabinet was a compromise solution: The operational outlays to run the Asian Women's Fund as well as medical and other welfare payments to former “comfort women” (up to 3 million yen per person) would come from the Government's budget, the actual “atonement money” (償い金 in Japanese) to be paid to the individual victims (2 million yen per person) would be drawn from the fund proper made up of private donations—contributions from citizens, companies and other non-state entities. And each former “comfort woman” willing to accept this “atonement money” would also receive a letter of apology from the Prime Minister of Japan.<sup>8</sup> A total of about 285 victims from South Korea, Taiwan, the

Philippines and Indonesia have accepted these payments.<sup>9</sup> No significant increase is expected, given the age of surviving victims and the refusal of a considerable number of survivors, especially in South Korea, because the money was not “official compensation” from the Japanese Government. The foundation is expected to be dissolved in the spring of 2007.

Whereas the type of victims in the case of the Asian Women's Fund is restricted specifically to former “comfort women,” the German foundation Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future is aimed at all kinds of forced labor. Theoretically this could include “sex slaves” as a form of slave labor, but in reality this type of victim was, as far as I know, not taken up in the deliberations that led to the establishment of the German foundation. The two foundations also differ widely in scale, both in the number of victims and in the amount of fund money available for atonement or compensation payments. There are no reliable statistics on the actual number of “comfort women” forced to serve the Japanese

military during the war. The highest numbers I have seen were between 100,000 and 200,000, but these figures most likely include other forms of forced labor. A more realistic figure would, I presume, be well below 100,000. Since fewer than 300 former “comfort women” actually accepted atonement money from the Japanese side, the discrepancy to the number of likely beneficiaries from the German fund is so great that it doesn't make any sense to compare the total sums available from the two funds for atonement or compensation. Instead a comparison of the amounts per person may be helpful. The figures for the Japanese side have already been mentioned. On the German side the nearest equivalent to sexual slavery would be the aggravated form of forced labor or so-called slave labor, for which the individual compensation payment was calculated at something like 15,000 DM or about 7,700 Euro. This would be significantly lower than the 2 million Yen or about 15,400 Euro per victim from the Asian Women's Fund. And while the atonement money on the Japanese side was to

come from private donations, because no political agreement could be reached on using public funds, the German compensation payments are based on the new law passed by the German parliament in July 2000 to set up a foundation financed jointly by Government and industry, with the Government's real share being much larger than its nominal 50 percent, because industry could claim tax deductions for their payments into the fund.

But what about sexual slavery in Europe? Were there no “comfort women” serving German soldiers in military brothels? And what became of them? The situation in Europe differed, depending on where the action was. In countries where prostitution and brothels existed customarily, for instance in France, the German occupation forces made use of such facilities by limiting visitors to German soldiers or officers and by medically supervising the women working there. In countries where prostitution was not supposed to exist, however, such as the former Soviet Union, it seems likely that the German military,

too, organized brothels for soldiers and officers. But very few details are known except by a few experts and the people immediately involved including, of course, the women working as sex slaves in whatever facilities were set up for such purposes. I don't believe that this chapter of the war in Europe has been adequately investigated, and I haven't heard of any German compensation payments to former sex slaves and the like. In this regard Germany doesn't seem to have done its homework yet. It seems odd that Germany, while providing a large amount of public money for compensation of all kinds of forced labor, would do so little if anything for the victims of sexual slavery, whereas Japan, while refusing to provide any public money for compensation of forced labor in general, does relatively better in the delicate case of the former "comfort women" including the provision of possibly more public money for medical support and welfare payments than the atonement money from private donations.

But the larger issue for Japan and its Asian

neighbors continues to be Tokyo's refusal to compensate former forced laborers in general. Japan's courts keep turning down the compensation claims by Chinese, Koreans and other Asians who will not stop challenging Tokyo until they die. And the Japanese Government keeps repeating its narrow-minded, legalistic excuses, that everything had been settled by the San Francisco Peace Treaty or by the agreements to establish diplomatic relations. Of course, nothing has really been settled for these former forced laborers from China or Korea. They were not even asked, and their own governments at the time were either military or Communist dictatorships that didn't much care about claims of individual citizens. For a long time these governments didn't even allow their citizens to raise such claims in court, let alone give them legal help. So statutes of limitation ran out, barring many of these aging claimants to pursue their cases effectively.

But this isn't really a legal issue. It is primarily a moral issue and a political issue. If the

political establishment of Japan would feel any moral responsibility vis-à-vis these old victims of forced labor, Japan's parliament could pass a new law giving these victims the right to claim at least some compensation for the forced labor they had to do for Japan; the law passed by the German parliament in July 2000 is one example.

It is the lack of a comparable political will in Japan to face the moral debts from the past that makes it so difficult for Tokyo to be accepted as a trusted friend in this region. What really matters, I repeat, are not legal arguments but the political will to come to terms with the past and to pay—at least something—for it.

**1** See "Why Textbook Research?" in Andrew Horvat and Gebhard Hielscher, ed., *Sharing the Burden of the Past: Legacies of War in Europe, America, and Asia* (Tokyo: The Asia Foundation, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2003), pp.3-4.

**2** The book identified in footnote 1 contains the proceedings of that symposium on "Textbooks, History, and War Memory in Europe, America, and Asia" held in Tokyo in November 2001.

**3** These figures are taken from two German language sources: *Knaurs Lexikon*, Droemer Knaur, Muenchen 1981, S.618 (see right column under "Oder-Neisse-Linie"), 635 (see left column under "Ostgebiete"); *Der Neue Brockhaus, in funf Baenden*, F.A. Brockhaus, Wiesbaden, 4. Auflage, 1968, Bd.4, S.52 (see left column under Oder-Neisse-Linie"), 89 (see middle column under "Ostgebiete"). Regarding the "Oder-Neisse-Linie" also *Aktuelles Lexikon Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, Sueddeutscher Verlag, Muenchen 1990, 1989 XVI S.175.

**4** These figures are taken from the report by Otto Graf Lambsdorff to the symposium on "Paying Wages 60 Years Overdue: Compensating Victims of World War II Forced Labor" held in Tokyo in February 2002; the proceedings of this symposium are also contained in the book identified

under footnote 1, see p. 152; Lambsdorff negotiated on behalf of the German Government.

**5** These figures derive from a German-language source: Mario von Baratta, ed., *Der Fischer Weltalmanach 2002* (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuchverlag,, 2001), column 262.

**6** Quoted literally from "*Comfort Women" and International Law*, Asian Women's Fund 98-10, Tokyo, March 1999, inside page of back cover equivalent to p.37.

**7** See Japanese language source 朝日年鑑データベース 1994 (Asahi Yearbook Databook 1994) '朝日新聞社, 東京 1994' p.47 left column 8月4日 (August 4) under 慰安婦の「強制」認め謝罪.

**8** See Japanese language source 知恵蔵 2001 朝日新聞現代用語 (The Asahi Encyclopedia of Current Terms 2001) '朝日新聞社' 東京 2001 pp. 182 right column (37) under Asian Women's Fund, 334 left column (22) under 戦後補償/従軍慰安婦問題, 399 left column (32) under 戦後補償/従軍慰安婦問題/アジア平和 国民基金/強制労働.

**9** According to a personal interview with the Fund's Executive Director, Ms. Momoyo Ise, in July 2003.



Seodo is one of the two main islands of Dokdo.

# NATIONALISM MANIFESTED IN JAPAN'S TERRITORIAL DISPUTE

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Tension between Korea and Japan has risen lately. The bilateral discord over Dokdo has spawned a growing anti-Japanese sentiment among Koreans, who are unhappy with ongoing distortions of history in Japanese textbooks, visits to Yasukuni Shrine by the Prime Minister and other high ranking Japanese officials, and the attempt to dispatch Japanese survey ships into Korea's exclusive economic zone.

Korea has been practicing "quiet diplomacy" towards Japan, which wants to create an issue over Dokdo despite the fact that the islets have remained in Korean hands until the present. Moreover, a series of acts by Prime Minister Koizumi has incited Japanese nationalism, prompting South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun to announce resolute countermeasures publicly in an "Open Message." The issue is not simply a squabble over material gain but encompasses problems other than those normally associated with territorial disputes among nations.

Korea and Japan are often described as being "geographically close yet so far apart." The

two countries have shared a long history with many twists and turns.

In his "Open Message," President Roh declared, "Japan's present claim to Dokdo amounts to contending the legitimacy of Japan's criminal history of waging wars of aggression and annihilation...We will continue to muster every measure of our national strength and diplomatic resources until the day when the Japanese Government remedies these wrongdoings."

Such strong words go beyond the significance of tiny islets in the East Sea, revealing the complex historical relationship between Korea and Japan. The rocky historical relationship has generated anti-Korean sentiments in Japan and anti-Japanese feelings in Korea; such antagonism did not begin with the current Dokdo problem.

Korea lost its diplomatic authority with the signing of the Treaty of 1905 (乙巳條約). The Chinese characters denoting that year are pronounced *ulsa* (乙巳), and modern Korean includes the phrase *ulssinyeon seureopda* (을씨년스럽다 "be like the *ulsa* year") to describe a wretched or mis-

erable situation. Thus, one can see just how difficult it is for Koreans to overcome their animosity toward Japan.

Japanese feelings toward Korea are mixed. The "Korean Wave" (韓流 *hallyu*—popularity of Korean dramas and music among non-Korean audiences) has swept Japan, while a book called *Disparaging the Korean Wave* (貶韓流) is also a bestseller.

The mutual hostility is vividly evident in the Dokdo issue. The latest flare-up has caused the Korean Government to move from "quiet diplomacy" to "resolute diplomacy vis-à-vis Japan." Even conscientious civic groups in Japan who have called for national reflection on the past are also criticizing Korea's alleged occupation of Dokdo. As the situation goes forward, both Korea and Japan must resolve their differences calmly.

First, politicizing the problem is wrong. That is to say, the Dokdo issue should not be used to unite political forces within the country. Japan has wanted to turn Dokdo into a disputed territory, but the move appears to be more

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (L) is led by a Shinto officiant as he visits the controversial Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo in this January 1, 2004 file photo. More than 300 Japanese lawmakers urged Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on August 2, 2005 to visit a shrine for the war dead on the 60th anniversary of Japan's defeat in World War II, saying he should not bow to pressure from China to stay away. © Yonhap News



about appealing to nationalism than it is about economic gain.

Despite criticism from nations all over Asia, the Japanese distort history, Japanese leaders



A group of tourists landing at a dock on Dokdo from a tour boat. The number of people allowed to visit Dokdo daily is limited to 400 in order to protect the island's ecosystem.

visit Yasukuni Shrine and the Japanese Government incites territorial conflicts with neighboring countries. These actions have sparked nationalism in Japan, where people have remained despondent since their nation was defeated in World War II. The Japanese leadership has continuously striven to erase traces of Korean influence in Japan's history and culture. They portray Korea as having been merely a vassal state of China for millennia, and they insist that the Japanese empire brought modernity to the Koreans. Such distortions are an attempt to disregard Japan's acceptance of the superior cultures of Baekje, Silla, Goryeo and Joseon. Instead, the Japanese have emphasized their superiority (over the Koreans) and evoked nationalist feelings among the populace.

This tendency is also evident in the Japanese attitude toward the Korean Wave. The recent success of Korean popular culture in Japan has clashed with the ongoing effort to erase vestiges of Korean influence in the country. Unlike other countries where the Korean Wave has succeeded, the Japanese public has simultaneously supported and disparaged it.

The Japanese penchant for summoning nationalism can be seen in the Dokdo issue as well:

(1) A conflict over sovereign rights to Dokdo would turn the islets into a disputed territory, resulting in a much greater loss than gain for the Koreans. By contrast, the Japanese continuously try to turn Dokdo into a disputed territory even though they have little to gain or

lose, even if they do not secure the territorial rights. In other words, the purpose for the controversy is not so much territory as it is the dispute itself.

(2) Many in Japan are not even paying attention to the Dokdo matter. The Government also fabricates the issue of Korea's alleged illegal occupation of Japanese territory as a way to rally the support of forces in Japan who call for reflection on history and oppose the Yasukuni Shrine visits.

(3) Going a step further, when issues are made out of Dokdo or the Senkaku Islands (under dispute with the Chinese and Taiwanese), the spotlight shifts to the need for armed forces, which have been hamstrung by Japan's Peace Constitution. Thus, Japan is trying to wrench itself free of not only Asian but also U.S. control. The world sees the current situation as a reversion back to militarism rather than simply nationalism. However, if the Japanese distance themselves from their Asian neighbors in order to revive domestic nationalism, they will have no

place to stand in the world, even if they embrace the slogan "Escape Asia, Join Europe!" (脱亞入歐).

The future of both Korea and Japan will be dark if historical issues such as Dokdo are used to whip up nationalist sentiment, smooth over internal discord and unify public opinion. Especially now, cool-headed approaches must be sought without fanning the flames of anti-Japanese and anti-Korean sentiment still higher.

To this end, Korea must go on the offensive to solve the issue. Korea has to address Japan's claims with sufficient historical documentation and logic. In the past, the Koreans were preempted by the Japanese in registering the names of the undersea features in the vicinity of Dokdo; now they need to respond rationally and with cool self-restraint.

The contentious history between Korea and Japan shows that unfortunate consequences are in store for both countries if they fail to maintain amicable relations. This fact should never be forgotten.

# DOKDO: HISTORIC CLASH AND ITS CULTURAL CONTEXT

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Asia will undoubtedly be the world's center stage in the 21st century, as most international pundits have already pointed out. The Asia-Pacific region, as an "economic axis," occupies an important place in the scheme of global politics. Moreover the interests of the nuclear and economic powers—the U.S., Russia and China—in the Asia-Pacific will steadily increase.

In this context, the issue of international security has a special significance. Despite that fact, much of the regional security debate seems to focus only on the progress of the talks concerning the North Korean nuclear weapons program and the Korean Peninsula reunification.

This approach tends to stress the Cold War legacy, in which the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), U.S. and Japan are in one camp, while the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), China and Russia are in the other. Such an analysis involves two perspectives. One is to put priority on the ROK, U.S. and Japan alliances regarding security guarantees. The other is the need for compromise among all concerned

parties in the process of bilateral or multilateral negotiations for regional peace and security. This also applies to the Korean-Japanese relationship.

There is no doubt that North Korean nuclear policy greatly affects regional and global stability, but other key factors must also be considered. In other words, one must think about the relationships among all the affected parties. These relationships have a regional impact even though they are not covered sufficiently in scholarly research.

Weight must be put on current events in order to discuss the topic of regional security and stability from this perspective. Take, for example, the explosive Dokdo issue or the geographical controversies such as requests to amend the names registered with global cartographic associations.

Previously, the Asia-Pacific was incorporated into the world order through intimidation and violence. The Western European powers came on the scene, carving up the vast territory of China, and Japan soon joined their ranks as a modern imperialist state. Japan emerged victorious from its war with Russia in 1905 and then perpetrated

violence on neighboring countries to position itself as the leading power in the region. Amid international apathy, imperial Japan occupied Korea militarily and ended up forcibly subjugating the country in 1910. Dokdo fell into Japanese hands during the Russo-Japanese War.

At this time the Korean people were plundered both politically and economically, exploited and oppressed. They suffered at the hands of the Japanese police and military. This was a painful and difficult time for the Koreans, whose long history, culture and identity were threatened. World War II ended in 1945, freeing Korea from Japanese oppression. However, the Koreans' long awaited time of happiness was cut short by the division of their country North and South and then the outbreak of war in 1950. After the war, the South Koreans struggled for democracy and their economy began to grow. Remarkable results were achieved by the 1970s, and the ROK joined the ranks of the "newly industrialized nations."

This is only a brief glimpse at modern Korean history, but it helps to understand the complex

relationship between Korea and Japan today. The two countries have favorable economic and social ties, and they remain on good terms with respect to international security. However, that is not enough to guarantee complete regional security. Korea and Japan must cooperate successfully and maintain friendly relations with regard to their position on talks with North Korea, economic growth and the global importance of the region.

However, Japan's claims to sovereignty over Dokdo sparks a new dispute in the region. The Japanese continue to insist that land they previously seized by force is rightfully theirs. They cling to the same reasoning that they held during their time of imperialism and colonialism. In other words, Japan is laying claim to territory that was taken forcibly during the colonial era.

The Korean people know the historic facts regarding Japanese behavior, and they are clearly angered by them. Under Japanese colonial rule, Koreans were impoverished, tortured, and imprisoned. They were subjected to forced labor and many of the women were sexually enslaved.



Korean KF-16 fighters flying in formation over Dokdo (L)

President Roh Moo-hyun delivering a "Special Address to the Nation" at Cheong Wa Dae on the morning of April 25, 2006 amidst increasing tension between Korea and Japan over Japan's pursuit of a maritime survey in Korea's East Sea EEZ (R)



The recent flare-up over Dokdo demonstrates that the issue is not confined to the legal, economic and commercial aspects of international politics. It is important to understand the issue in the context of cultural and historical conditions as they relate to the human spirit and the dignity of a nation's people. That is to say, resolution of the issue will not be achieved by disregarding history. The only solution is through mutual respect and trust.

The Dokdo controversy to the Japanese may have been about conducting an oceanographic survey in waters under dispute. However, it is different for the Koreans. In his Open Message on April 25, ROK President Roh Moo-hyun declared that Dokdo was more than a simple territorial issue. He said that it symbolized the complete recovery of sovereignty and a rectification of a false historical record. He also stated that the islets would never be relinquished under any circumstances and that no compromise was possible. Thus, Dokdo is part of a struggle for recovering historical truth, liberation and sovereignty.

In this connection, the world's scholars, international relations specialists and international

opinion leaders, must all understand this issue correctly. Dokdo is more than an issue complicating global security and the world economy. As Alain Touraine contends, cultural issues must be the focus of reassessment in today's new paradigm, and the Dokdo issue reinforces that assertion. Namely, understanding the processes behind the history, culture and identity of a nation and its people is the requisite for understanding the logic applied in the political arena. The differing positions of Korea and Japan on history and the Dokdo issue bear out what is discussed above.

As for national sovereignty issues, people today must compromise based on democratic and humanitarian principles. Korea has been involved in the human rights debate inside and outside the country, and the Korean response to Japanese designs on Dokdo is in line with this principle. The Koreans have striven to oppose violence with non-violent means. In the same way they must seek dialogue and compromise while always respecting history and human rights as the diplomatic approach for resolving the current disagreement with Japan.



# Specialists' Articles on the East Sea

Korea's uphill battle to give a sea its own name back is gaining ground. The sea in question is the East Sea, the body of water situated between Korea and Japan. Throughout most of its history, the sea was called East Sea or several variations thereof, but Japan began engineering to change the name into Sea of Japan beginning in the latter part of the 19th century. In 1923, Japan as the colonial master of Korea unilaterally registered the new name with the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO), and at its 1929 conference, the world organization adopted the new name proposed by imperial Japan.

After liberation, Korea took the issue to IHO meetings and the UN Conference on the Standardization of Geographic Names (UNCSSGN). In the latter part of the 20th century, based on the resolutions of the two international organizations, the Korean Government issued a statement of request that "East Sea/Sea of Japan" be accepted as the standard name pending a final decision. Japan rejected the Korean proposal.

Nonetheless, Rand McNally, one of the largest mapmakers in the United States, described the sea as "Sea of Japan (East Sea)" in the 1997 *Rand McNally World Atlas* (pp. 28-31). In 1999, the National Geographic Society of the United States recognized that Korea had a legitimate complaint about the name of the body of water in question and began using "Sea of Japan (East Sea)." More and more international mapmakers and organizations are following suit. The campaign to restore the name of the sea is significant from the standpoint of removing one of the last vestiges of cruel Japanese colonialism. Just as important is the fact that geographical names carry with them unique historical and cultural implications. Their original names should be kept that way.

Presented in this section of the book are articles by three international experts on the history of the East Sea and the region where the sea is situated.

[Dokdo, an island off the East Coast](#)

**Research on the Relationship Between the Name "East Sea" and Non-Han Regional Governments of Northeast China after the T'ang Dynasty**

[Cheng Long](#) Lecturer, Department of History, Peking University

**The Name of the East Sea in Historic Perspective**

[Henny Sevenije](#) Professor, University of Groningen, The Netherlands

**On Renaming the "Sea of Japan"**

[V.V. Glushkov](#) Professor, Moscow State University

# RESEARCH ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NAME “EAST SEA” AND NON-HAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS OF NORTHEAST CHINA AFTER THE T’ANG DYNASTY<sup>1</sup>

## Cheng Long

Lecturer, Department of History,  
Peking University

Dr. Cheng Long is a lecturer in the History Department of Peking University, Beijing, China. In recent years, he published half a dozen theses in the *Journal of Chinese Historical Studies and Historical Geography*, including “Reading the Map of Qianzhen in the Atlas of Guangyu.”

The sea area to the east of the Korean Peninsula, which is located to the west of Japan and the southwest of Ku Ye Island (Sakhalin), has been called “Sea of Japan” internationally for the past century or so. Documents of ancient China indicate that the naming of this sea area started from the T’ang Dynasty (618-907). In history, hundreds of groups of non-Han aborigines lived in the vast land of Northeast China, some of which built up their local governments and their own special administrative systems. And some of them moved into the central part of China and gained control over the whole country with powerful cavalries. These cases were not rare after the T’ang Dynasty.

The northeast area of China is close to the Sea of Japan. Compared with the settlers of other places, the aborigines of Northeast China or the Korean Peninsula are much more familiar with this sea area to the east of them. They must be the

ones who called these waters the “East Sea” from the very beginning.

Then we find a very interesting phenomenon that whenever the regional non-Han governments from Northeast China became powerful enough to control the whole of China or at least a great part of it, the name “East Sea” for this sea area was recorded in the Chinese literature of the same period, but that whenever the regional non-Han governments from the Northeast were weak and could not build up an empire of vast land, we could find many different names in the temporal records in addition to “East Sea.”

During the T’ang Dynasty, which was established by people of Han nationality, Northeast China was occupied by the minority Mohe (Malgal). The Mohe kingdom of Bohai was not among the powerful tribes in the empire. Their knowledge about this sea area did not spread all over China at that time. Different names in the ancient literature

<sup>1</sup> Source: This article was first presented at the 11th International Seminar on the Naming of Seas that was held in October 2005 in Washington DC, the United States. The seminar was co-hosted by the *Korea Daily* in Washington DC and the Society for East Sea in Korea. The article is published here with the permission of the hosts.



*Asea Zenzu* (亞世亞全圖 圖 Complete Map of Asia, 1794) 47.5×59cm, by Kuniakira Katsuragawa (Hoshū; 1751~1809)  
The East Sea is marked as “Sea of Joseon” on this map that was published in Japan. The mapmaker appears to have used a map originally made in Russia and changed the Russian geographical names into Japanese.

Source: Collection of Dokdo Museum

Note: These two maps do not have a direct relationship to the text by Lecturer Cheng Long





#### Evidence Against Evidence

In a keynote speech at Pusan University of Foreign Studies on April 12, 2006, Professor Yuji Hosaka displays *Dainihonzenzu* (The Complete Map of Great Japan, 1876), a map on which Japan has based its alleged sovereignty over Dokdo. He explained that, to the contrary, the map was just one more evidence of Korean sovereignty over Dokdo. © Yonhap News

Note: These two maps do not have a direct relationship to the text by Lecturer Cheng Long

of this period showed that most of the Chinese knew little about this sea area or at least they did not have a single name for it. In *Tang Hui Yao* (Institutional History of the T'ang Dynasty, 唐會要), one of the most important works of literature of the T'ang Dynasty, more than three names were recorded for the same sea area, among which were "Xiao Sea" (Small Sea), "Shao Sea" (Young Sea) and "Da Sea" (Great Sea). But the meaning of the name only referred to parts of the sea area to the east of the Korean Peninsula, not the whole area stretching to Japan. We have confirmed that the documents of T'ang Dynasty did not contain a proper name referring to this whole sea area.

In the late T'ang Dynasty, the minority of Qidan (Khitan) from Northeast China became a great power. During the coming 100 years, it built

a great empire Liao (947-1125) which controlled most of North China, while the Song (Sung) Government (960-1279) controlled the rest. People of Qidan also knew much about the sea area and they left many documents mentioning it. The *History of Liao* (遼史) Dynasty was such a document. It was one of the 24 documents certificated by the governments of past dynasties. It recorded "East Sea" as the name of this sea area for the first time. Obviously, with the help of military power, the people of Qidan made all the Chinese accept their own knowledge and opinions about the sea area east of themselves. The people in the central part of China had no opportunities to have contact with the sea area, so "East Sea" could only be the name given by the aborigines living along the western shore of the sea area—Northeast

China or the Korean Peninsula. And the people of Qidan were such aborigines. The record of the "East Sea" in the formal documents of ancient China was their contribution.

The Mongol Government (1260-1368) ended the reign of the Song Dynasty and reunified the county. But these people from the steppe had much more interest in horses than the sea and boats. Their knowledge about the East Sea was so meager that they called it "Jing Sea" (Sea Full of Whales). The successor, Ming Government (1368-1644), was not any better, and it was of Han nationality. Apart from accepting the name of "Jing Sea" used by the Mongol, they also called the sea "Nan Sea" (South Sea). At this time, in Northeast China, the people of Nvzhen (ancestors of the Qing [Ch'ing] Government) were developing their own kingdom. So it was reasonable that the people of the Ming Dynasty had little geographical information outside their domain. The different names of this sea area came from the ignorance of the Yüan and Ming Governments, and this caused much confusion.

This confusion dissipated once the aborigines who thoroughly knew the sea area came into power. These non-Han aborigines were the people of Nvzhen who built up the Qing Government (1616-1911), and they firmly established the name "East Sea."

We can tell from the document entitled *Stories of Building up the Country* (開國龍興記) that before the Qing Government was founded, the people of Nvzhen had called the sea area "East Sea" for a long time. The article *Ji Dong Hai Zhu Wen* (祭東海祝文) printed in the book *Da Jin Ji Li* (大金集禮) showed us some proof that the name "East Sea" was given to this sea area by the Nvzhen people, the aborigines living on the eastern coast. After the Jin Dynasty of northern Manchuria, the descendants of Muzhen (Genghis Khan), accepted the name "East Sea" from their ancestors. Because the relationship between the northeast and the central part was not close enough to make the name popular, we seldom see records about the "East Sea" in documents of that time. In the 17th century, when the Manchurians strength-

ened in the Northeast and established the Qing Government, the name East Sea became popular again, and it frequently reappeared in books of that time. In 1664, when the Qing Government moved its capital city from Mukden to Peking (Beijing), the name “East Sea” spread widely throughout China. Many documents recorded “East Sea” as the name of the sea area. For example, a document about the old capital city of the Qing Government *Shen Jing Tong Zhi* (盛京通志) said in the 12th volume, “The east boundary of General Jilin is the East Sea.” (General Jilin was the administrator of Northeast China in the late Qing Dynasty). All this is proof that the non-Han Government of the Qing Dynasty from Northeast China replaced the different names with “East Sea” again as had the earlier Liao Dynasty that was established by the Qidan people.

There are distinct records about the range of “East Sea” in the documents of Qing Dynasty, which includes the whole Dada Channel in the north and the whole sea area to the north of the Korean Peninsula in the south. According to *Shuo*

*Fang Bei Cheng* (朔方備乘) volume one, “Huntong River” (混同江), “The confluence of the Songhua River (松花江) and the Hei River (黑水), runs through Ning Gu Ta (寧吉塔) and San Xing (三姓) and flows into the East Sea.” The Huntong River is the lower reaches of the Heilong River (黑龍江). Another document named *Dong Bei Bian Fang Ji Yao* (東北邊防緝要) said that some of the islands near Ku Ye Island (Sakhalin) are at the estuary of the Huntong River, such as the East Sea Island (See volume one, *Ku Ye Dao Yan Ge Xing Sheng Kao*, 庫頁島沿革形勝考). These records demonstrate that the sea area into which the Huntong River flows is called the “East Sea.” In the book *Hai Guo Tu zhi* (海國圖志) by Wei Yuan of the Qing Dynasty, the “East Sea” was marked beside the east coast of the Korean Peninsula, at the northern latitude of 40.5° (See volume three, *Map of Northern Korean Boundary, Chao Xian Guo Bei Jing Tu*, 朝鮮國北境圖). This indicates that the “East Sea” in Chinese historical records means the same sea area that the Western colonialists called “Sea of Japan.”

In conclusion, all the documents and

research prove that the name “East Sea,” which originally appeared in the Liao and Jin Dynasties, was continually used by Nvzhen and their Manchurian descendants, who lived beside this sea area until the late Qing Dynasty. During that period, although there were some other names for parts of the sea area, only “East Sea” was used persistently for the whole sea area. The name “Sea of Japan” used by Western colonialists in modern history doesn’t have any historical basis.

In modern times, a lot of lands along the shore of the East Sea were ceded to Russia. But “East Sea” was still the name used by most Chinese until the late 19th century. After the victory in the war with China in 1895, Japan occupied the Korean Peninsula and parts of Northeast China. Then the name “Sea of Japan” became more popular than “East Sea.”

Finally, we can see that after the T’ang Dynasty, there was a relationship between the name “East Sea” and the non-Han governments

originating in Northeast China. Whenever the non-Han governments from Northeast China were powerful enough to control the whole of China like the Qing Dynasty or at least a great part of it like the Liao Dynasty, the name “East Sea” was recorded in the Chinese literature of the same period. When the non-Han governments originally from Northeast China were weak and could not build up an empire encompassing most of China as did the Mohe during the T’ang Dynasty or when the aborigines in the Northeast were ruled by the Yüan and Ming Dynasties, we could find many different names in the temporal records in addition to “East Sea” for this sea area.



Mulgae (Seal) Rock and a fishing vessel

# THE NAME OF THE EAST SEA IN HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE <sup>1</sup>

**Henny Sevenije**

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The Netherlands

Henny Sevenije (aka Lee Hae-Kang) is a specialist in 17th century documents about Korea and has made many documents accessible to the general public. He is the webmaster of a site about the early Dutch contacts with Korea.

<sup>1</sup> Source: This article was first presented at the 11th International Seminar on the Naming of Seas that was held in October 2005 in Washington DC, the United States. The seminar was co-hosted by the *Korea Daily* in Washington DC and the Society for East Sea in Korea. The article is published here with the permission of the hosts.

At the previous nine conferences on the naming of the East Sea, many people have dealt with the different names for the sea and proven that the name “East Sea” prevailed on Western maps during the ancient period. In papers presented to those meetings, I have not only seen excellent proposals for alternatives (Hahn, Kadmon, Naumov, and many others) but also excellent papers which described the importance of names. I believe it was Naftali Kadmon who described the importance of names in the most neutral way and with many examples. Independently, we have reached the conclusion that de la Perouse was the first to use the name “Japanese Sea” to describe the “East Sea” (Editor’s note: This was in May 1787).

In my previous paper I tried to show the importance of the history of the mapmakers and the classification of the maps in order to establish some kind of logic in the development of countries on these maps and the names of the bodies of waters surrounding these countries. Since I discovered some maps that have not been discussed

before, especially the *Chinae, Olim Sinarum Regionis, Nova Descriptio* (1584, 1602) by Abraham Ortelius (1527 – 1598), I would like to add some additional notes to my previous papers. The *Chinae, Olim Sinarum Regionis, Nova Descriptio* was the first Western map of China based upon the reports of Portuguese mapmaker Luis de Barbuda and was first published in Ortelius’ *Theatrum* of 1584.

The most curious part of this map is that Korea is hanging from Japan. We can recognize Korea in the map because it has the same shape as the ones used by other later mapmakers to indicate Korea, only placed in its correct location. In this same atlas we can also see the shape of Japan introduced by Mercator (Gerardus Mercator 1518 – 1594), and in 1595, in the *Theatrum*, Ortelius used the map, which was introduced to him by Luis Teixeira.

I have not observed “East Sea” or “Japanese Sea” on any original maps; this always occurs on copies based upon the original first publisher. Since my previous paper, I have examined some

additional curious maps, supporting the content of my original thesis, which was more or less confirmed by papers presented in previous seminars. From research it becomes clear that the name of this body of water prior to the Conference of the International Hydrographical Organization in 1923 was more often referred to as the “Korea Sea” or “East Sea” (50 percent), while 25 percent of the maps did not name it and the remainder 25 percent as the “Japanese Sea.”

At the Conference of the International Hydrographic Organization in 1923, a resolution was accepted to permanently name the body of water as the “Sea of Japan.” Korea could not dispute the matter, since it, like Manchuria, was occupied by Japan and was viewed by the countries in attendance at the conference as a Japanese province.

If you were asked to vary the type sizes for different names for East Sea according to the number of their occurrences in old maps, you would have to pick big bold letters for “East Sea” and very small subscripts for “Japanese Sea/Sea of Japan.”

In 1995, Wu Song-Di of Fudan University Shanghai explained the use of the “Sea of Japan” in old Chinese documents, and Yee Sang-Tae, a senior researcher for the Korean National History Compilation Committee, did the same regarding Korean historical documents. Professors Alexei V. Postnikov and Dr Evgenii M. Popelov explained the importance and history of the use of Russian names for seas, in particular for the body of water in question. All of them agreed that the names “East Sea” and “Korean Sea,” or their variations, had a longer history and occurred more frequently than any other name. Only the map of Mateo Ricci appeared to be an exception, but was an example which was not followed by other cartographers. So roughly speaking, from the 16th till the 18th century the sea in question was NOT called the “Sea of Japan” by anyone except Mateo Ricci.

After de la Perouse, the name “Japanese Sea” became fashionable. In 1995, Seo Jeong-cheol tried to propose an alternative, since neither “East Sea” nor “Japanese Sea” was agreeable to him. Hiroo Aoyama was of a different opinion and

#### Map Published by the Japanese Government Shows Sea of Joseon (Korea)

This 19th century map published by the Japanese Government marks the waters adjoining the east coast of the Korean Peninsula as the "Sea of Joseon (Korea)," and includes Ulleungdo and Usan (Dokdo) in the Gulf of Yeongheung as Korean territory, colored yellow, to distinguish them from Japanese territory. In 1928, a German Doctor Phillip von Siebold smuggled this map titled *Nihonhenkairyukuzu* (A Sketch of Japan and Bordering Areas), originally published in 1809 by Kageyasu Takahashi, out of Japan by labeling the map with a different title. In those days, it was illegal to take any map published in Japan outside the country for national security reasons.

Source: Collection of Paik Choong-hyun, Professor at Seoul National University  
Note: This map does not have a direct relationship to the text by Professor Sevenije.

selectively chose maps on which only the name Japanese Sea was used and declared that this was the standard and there could be no further discussion about the name. Chen Cai and An Hu Sen from Chanchun University in China more or less repeated the earlier opinions of the Chinese and thus China followed more or less the international practice and started using "Sea of Japan" for the sea in question.

Vladimir Kusov from the Moscow State University explained the developments of Korea on Korean maps, and one quote in particular impressed me. I refer to the paper in which he quotes Ivan Gorcharov (1812–1891) as saying that he observed one particular feature about the Koreans: asked about their country, town, etc, they answered the truth...ask a Japanese or a Chinese the same question? They were not like the Koreans. This pattern of proving that the name of "East Sea" or something similar was used much more in the past, was repeated in subsequent seminars and eventually many people from different countries, demonstrated the point. Some

of them have shown the importance of names, such as Peter Raper, of the United Nations Group of Experts on geographical names, Seo Jeong-cheol from the viewpoint of cognitive linguistics, and Naftali Kadmon who argued in favor of the use of one international name for all seas and place names and in case of doubt the use of double names. For example, for the sea in question, Kadmon argued that the names "East Sea" and "Sea of Japan" should both be used until the countries surrounding the sea could agree upon one name. There are too many excellent papers from the previous seminars for me to remark on, even in summary, but suffice it to say that "a picture says more than a thousand words" and maps are like pictures, indeed they were often used as such so that people could easily understand what was going on in the big wide world, in a time when there were few newspapers or other ways of disseminating news.

But what is this really about? It's not only the name which is so important but also recognition of past transgressions and loss of identity. Both



China and Korea suffered a lot during the Japanese occupations. Koreans were forced to use Japanese names for their own locations and even forced to use Japanese personal names. The Japanese Government has never acknowledged any responsibility and continues to downplay its role in World War II in the Japanese textbooks used in schools. Despite international criticism, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi still regularly visits the Yasukuni Shrine where many war criminals from World War II are buried.

After World War II (which the Americans call the Great War), Germany was a humble partner in many of the negotiations and Germans came to realize and acknowledge that many wrongs had been committed. Beginning With Willy Brand, who

openly expressed remorse for Germany's actions, many have sought to atone for the past. Germany does everything it can NOT to forget what happened during World War II, and to remember it as a lesson for the future. It maintains war memorials for the real victims of the war, the Jews, and also other innocent victims in their country. Germany opposes any form of Neo-Nazism, which might spring up in the wake of unification and strives to solve the problems of possible Neo-Nazism.

In Japan, however, the only war memorials can be found in Nagasaki and Hiroshima and they are used to show the world how wrongfully the United States bombed these two cities with atomic bombs. I don't intend to start a discussion about atomic bombs; I just want to show how the



Unidentified Cloniidae



Soft coral

The confluence of cold and warm ocean currents in the waters surrounding Dokdo serves as an ideal habitat for diverse marine organisms, including coral reefs and over 100 species of fish. The unique ecology in the waters around Dokdo attracts many marine biologists.


Japanese use these incidents to their advantage. Germany, on the other hand, does not use the bombing of Dresden by the allies as a ploy to shift the blame or to confuse the issues.

When the Americans entered Korea in the wake of World War II, the majority of the soldiers, including MacArthur, were only aware that they came to occupy Japanese lands and were surprised when they were welcomed by Korean children waving and shouting “*Miguk, Miguk.*” (America, America). Many of the soldiers erroneously thought the children were shouting “*Me Gook*” (a derogatory racial term for an Asian) and shouted happily back: “*We are Americans*” or something of the sort.

Americans, and maybe most Westerners, knew a great deal about Europe, since much of the dominantly white population of America traced its roots to Europe, but knew only a little about Japan and China, and virtually nothing about Korea. This was reflected in the policy towards Asia. I am not here to stir up the whole politics towards Asia, in particular Japan, Korea and

China, issue and the dubious role America sometimes played. There are historians who know much more about this aspect than I do, but it did have an enormous impact on events in East Asia.

One thing is for certain; the Japanese Government continues to downplay its role in World War II. Korea and China are both concerned about the reawakened militarism that made Japan powerful and imperialistic in the past and the right-wing factions in the present Japanese Government. Recently I witness the quest of a Japanese woman, a teacher, who writes books concerning the Nanjing (or Nanking) Massacre in which approximately 30,000 people were cruelly murdered by the Japanese soldiers in an orgy of violence. I asked myself why would a Japanese woman write about this? She claims that the Japanese Government does everything to make people forget these incidents and the people murdered. She feels that the victims don’t deserve to be forgotten, nor all the other people who survived the Massacre and have suffered throughout their lives. As she went about interviewing the survivors



Scuba diver conducting underwater survey

she was often faced with people who had vowed that they would never talk to a Japanese person again. Those who did speak often took weeks before they could put their stories into words—so deep was the pain. I could relate to their feelings for I have seen first hand similar behavior displayed by Dutch people interned in Japanese prisoner-of-war camps in Indonesia.

The Japanese have committed a great deal of wrong and yet, somehow, the American forces seem to have been more lenient toward Japan than the Allied forces have been to Germany.

The name of “*Sea of Japan*” is just another example of Japanese unwillingness to give up its old imperialism and acknowledge its wrong to Korea. Maybe this is the time to set the record straight.

# ON RENAMING THE “SEA OF JAPAN”

**V.V. Glushkov**  
Professor, State University in Moscow

Dr. V. V. Glushkov is professor of geodesy and geographic information at a State University in Moscow. Recently, Dr. Glushkov has been conducting research in historical geography and mapmaking in Northeast China, Korea, and Japan with a special emphasis on discussing controversies involving geographical names in the region.

The Korean Peninsula and nearby islands have remained a single entity under various names over the centuries. For example, ancient Chinese texts sometimes refer to Korea as the “Eastern Kingdom” (東國, 東方國家, etc.) or “Great East” (大東), given its proximity to the “Middle Kingdom.” Sometimes, old names for Korea would also include the word for “sea” (海), which is also an indirect reference to the eastward location of the Peninsula vis-à-vis China. Examples include “Maritime Kingdom” (海國, 洋國) and “Blue Sea” (青海).

The names for the waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula, like the names for Korea itself, have origins that go back for centuries. This writer finds particularly fascinating the history of the names for the waters between the Korean Peninsula and the Japanese islands. World maps today most often refer to this body of water as the “Sea of Japan” or sometimes as the “Sea of Japan/East Sea,” but only maps made in Korea call it exclusively the “East Sea.”<sup>1</sup>



Figure 1  
Map of the World Health Organization (2003)

As for shape, this is a semi-enclosed sea bounded by the coastlines of Russia, North Korea, South Korea and Japan. To the south it connects to the Yellow Sea via the Korean Strait and East China Sea. The Tsugaru Strait links the sea to the Pacific Ocean to the east, while the Strait of Nevelskoi (Strait of Tartary) in the north and La Perouse Strait in the northeast both lead to the Sea of Okhotsk.

The sea between Korea and Japan is about 2,555 kilometers long north to south and is 1,070 kilometers across at its widest point. The total surface area is about 978,000 km<sup>2</sup>, and the mean depth is 1,752 meters.

The name “Mar Coria” (“Sea of Korea”) first

Figure 2 Map by Emanuel Godinho de Eredia (1615)




appears on a European map, made by the Portuguese cartographer Emanuel Godinho de Eredia, in 1615. The appellation “Mare Di Corai” (“Sea of Korea”) was then used in 1647 on a hydrographic chart by British cartographer Sir Robert Dudley (1574-1649).

Figure 3 Map by Sir Robert Dudley (1647)



Figure 4 Map by Herman Moll (1714)



The Frenchman Jean Baptiste Traemier included “Mar de Coree” (“Sea of Korea”) on his *Map of Japan* in 1679. Moreover, the *Map of Asia* drawn by the Dutch-Englishman Herman Moll (died 1732) in 1714 describes the waters between Korea and Japan as the “Sea of Corea.”

The St. Petersburg Science Academy included the Russian equivalent for “Korean Sea” on the Map of Asia in its *Atlas for Students* in 1737.

From this time until the early 19th century, terms for “Korean Sea” appeared on maps made in Russia as well as many other countries. A standout example is the atlas published by the St. Petersburg Academy in 1745. This world-class cartographic work contains maps of nineteen Russian regions and a Map of Asia that includes the designation “Korean Sea.”

This map is based on cartographic materials from Russia and some other countries. It also included new details collected during two explorations (1725-1730 and 1733-1741) to Kamchatka and further east by the famous





Figure 5 Russian Map of Asia (1737)  
© Russian Academy of Science in St. Petersburg




Figure 6 Russian Map of Asia (1745)

Figure 7 Asian section of a world map by Emmanuel Bowen (1752)



Figure 8 Map by Ivan Golikov (1787)



Figure 9 British map (1791)



Figure 10 German map (1793)

Danish-born navigator Vitus Bearing, who served in the Russian Navy.

Meanwhile, a world map produced by English cartographer Emmanuel Bowen (1694–1767) in 1752<sup>Figure 7</sup> uses the term “Sea of Korea.”

The Russians revised the 1745 version of their *Map of Asia* and reissued it in 1757. Scholars believe the work influenced the contents of numerous maps, both Russian and non-Russian, in the late 18th century. Most of the maps label the waters under discussion as the “Sea of

Corea/Korea,” including one produced in 1787 by Russian sea captain Ivan Golikov<sup>Figure 8</sup> and his crew. Other examples include a British map of 1791,<sup>Figure 9</sup> a German map of 1793<sup>Figure 10</sup> and a map produced by English cartographer James Wyld (1812–1887) in 1845.<sup>Figure 11</sup>

Importantly, the Japanese also referred to the waters in question as the “Joseon Sea” or “Sea of Joseon” (朝鮮海) during the 18th and 19th centuries, when “Joseon” was the name used for Korea. One example attesting to this fact is the *Asea Zenzu* (Complete Map of Asia) drawn by Japanese cartographer Kuniakira Katsuragawa (Honshû; 1751–1809) and produced by the Katsuragawa Company in 1794. The “Sea of Joseon” reference is also found on works by prominent Japanese geographers Kageyasu Takahashi (1785–1829) in 1809<sup>Figure 12</sup> and Yoshishige Murakami in 1871.<sup>Figure 13</sup>

The first known reference to the “Sea of Japan” appeared in 1602, on a world map drawn



Figure 11 Map by James Wyld (1845)

Figure 12 *Nihonhenkairyukuzu* (A Sketch of Japan and Bordering Areas) by Kageyasu Takahashi (1809)



Figure 13 World map by Yoshishige Murakami (1871)

Figure 14 Map of the North Sea and Norwegian Sea (2006)



by Italian Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) in Beijing. Use of this appellation did not become widespread, although it appeared on a new map of China by French cartographer Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon d'Anville in 1737. The term "Sea of Japan" was not generally accepted in the West, while "Sea of Corea/Korea" or "East Sea" was often used.

Japan, an island nation, remained isolated for many centuries, and Europeans became aware of Japan much later than they did Korea, which is part of the Asian mainland. This seems to be the reason why Westerners generally tended to call the waters between Korea and Japan "Sea of Corea/Korea" despite the prominence of French cartography in the early 18th century.

At this point, it is useful to point to the example of the Norwegian Sea,<sup>Figure 14</sup> the name of the waters between the Scandinavian Peninsula and Iceland. This body of water is also bounded by two countries (Iceland and Norway), but Norway, part of the mainland, was known before the island Iceland was. The first explorers who crossed the continent traveled from east to west, and the waters they encountered were naturally called the "Norwegian Sea" rather than the "Icelandic Sea."

French explorer Jean-Francois de la Perouse studied the waters between Korea and Japan in 1787. At the end of his investigation, he created maps for a new atlas and borrowed the same

names used by Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon d'Anville. Thus, the term "Sea of Japan" appears on his maps.

In 1805, the sea routes in the waters between Korea and Japan were surveyed as part of Russia's first mission to circumnavigate the globe, a project led by Adam Johan von Krusenstern (1770–1846). The remarkable scientific data gained during this voyage served as the basis for many subsequent charts and maps of the Pacific Ocean produced by the Russians. This included the *South Sea Atlas* published in 1826, which describes the waters in question as the "Sea of Japan." Krusenstern was a Western-trained navigator (he graduated from the Naval Academy in St. Petersburg, and served in the British Royal Navy) and selected "Sea of Japan" instead of the name "Sea of Korea, which had appeared on Russian maps for the previous century.<sup>2</sup> Regrettably, the stature of a prominent navigator normally carries more weight than Russian tradition when it comes to geographic naming.

However, the designation proposed by

Krusenstern was not immediately reflected in all Russian cartography. The Russian phrase for "Sea of Korea" appeared on the *General Map of Asia*, which was produced to show the contemporary administrative divisions in East Asia. This work was produced by the Geographic Bureau in the Ministry of Education in 1826, the same year that the *South Sea Atlas* was issued. The last official Russian map to bear the "Sea of Korea" reference was the *Map of the Arctic Ocean & East Sea* drawn on the basis of surveys by sea route officials in the Ministry of Maritime Affairs in 1844.

It should be noted that the waters separating the Korean Peninsula from the Japanese Archipelago were called the "Sea of Korea" by European cartographers for some 240 years and by Russian mapmakers for 107 years before the phrase "Sea of Japan" came into vogue.

Today, the Koreans do not believe it is proper to use the name of one country to designate a body of water bounded by four countries. They cite the fact that the waters in question are divided into exclusive zones for each peripheral country. There

Figure 15 Map by B.D. Okell & J. Cluer Publisher (1694)



would be no objection to the name "Sea of Japan" if, for example, this were Japan's inland sea and exclusive Japanese territory for economic exploitation. Therefore, the Koreans have used the neutral term "East Sea" to designate the waters between the two countries.

In the past, Europeans also called these waters "East Sea" or some equivalent.

For example, a world map produced in England by B.D. Okell & J. Cluer Publisher in 1694 employs the term "Oriental Sea," Figure 15 and a 1705 map by Frenchman Guillaume de l'Isle (1675–1726) Figure 16 includes both "Mer Orientale ("East Sea") and "Mer de Coree ("Sea of Korea"). Mid-18th century Russian maps referred to the Pacific Ocean as the "East Sea."

Modern scholars from around the world accept this point of view, and this writer believes the global academic community should agree on standards for the names applied to historical events and geographic locations.




Figure 16 Map by Guillaume de l'Isle (1705)



Figure 17 Complete Map of the Eight Provinces of Korea (1530)

The historical record shows that the body of water under discussion was called the “East Sea” two millennia ago. This fact is mentioned in the section on Goguryeo<sup>3</sup> founder King Dongmyeong (東明聖王 58-19 BCE) in the *Samguk sagi* (History of the Three Kingdoms; 三國史記), a work written in 1145. A particularly important revelation in this chronicle is the use of the name “East Sea” as far back as 37 BCE.

In addition, “East Sea” is etched on a stone monument erected in lands north of the Yalu in 414 to commemorate the military exploits of Goguryeo King Gwanggaeto (廣開土王 r. 391-413). The great military campaigns of this king, whose name literally means “broad expander of domain,” are detailed on this stone stele.

Moreover, the “East Sea” phrase is included on the *Palto chongdo* (Complete Map the Eight

Provinces of Korea (八道總圖), part of the *Shinjeung tongguk yeoji seungnam* (新增東國輿地勝覽; A Revised Edition of the Augmented Survey of the Geography of Korea) produced in 1530.<sup>Figure 17</sup> The term “Sea of Japan” appears for the first time in the 18th century, some 700 years after the initial use of “East Sea.”

With global exploration, the Europeans began, in the 16th century, to include the Korean Peninsula and Japanese Archipelago, and the first name that the Europeans knew for the waters between the two states was “East Sea.” They did not begin to adopt the term “Sea of Japan” until the 17th century.

Turning to names related to locations, the world’s geographic community has long followed the practice of naming oceans and seas based on a nearby continent (or continents)—not

islands. Thus some call the waters north of Eurasia the Northern Ocean. (It is known as the “Arctic Ocean,” derived from *Arktos*, the Greek name for the constellation of the Great Bear Ursa Major, visible only in the Northern Hemisphere.) The stretch of Pacific Ocean east of the Russian Empire was described on Russian maps as “East Sea” in the 18th century and “East Ocean” in the 19th century.

In 2000, the name “Southern Ocean” began to appear on world maps to refer to the waters south of Africa and Australia. For the same reasons, the name of the waters to the north and northwest of Europe are known as the “North Sea”.<sup>Figure 14</sup> No one has ever attempted to replace “North Sea” with “English Sea” or “British Sea,” even when the power of the British Empire was at its height.

This writer believes that “East Sea” is the appropriate name for the waters east of the Korean Peninsula, based on geographical and navigational reasons as well as on the practices followed on other maps around the world.

The following table was compiled after analyzing ancient maps and atlases preserved at many of the world’s leading libraries; the technical points mentioned above are considered in organizing the data. The statistics cover the national orientation of the various names for the waters separating the Korean Peninsula from the Japanese Archipelago. These names appeared on maps made between 1500 and 1900.

Frequency of Names for Waters between Korea and Japan						
	1500s	1600s	1700s	1800s	1900	Total
Korea*	-	39	341	60	-	440/58%
Japan	-	17	46	69	1	123/16%
China	13	28	10	-	-	54/7%
Other	16	41	80	12	-	146/19%
<b>Total</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>467</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>763/100%</b>

\* Korean - related names include “East Sea,” “Sea of Corea/Korea,” “Sea of Joseon,” “Oriental Sea” and “Gulf of Corea/Korea.”

Korean scholars have selected 763 maps from various countries. The table shows us the following facts: Over a 400-year span, names related to Korea appeared 440 times (58%) to Japan 123 times (16%), to China 54 times (7%) and to other origins 146 times (19%). Thus, the over-

whelming majority of references on ancient maps were oriented toward Korea.

On the other hand, “Sea of Japan” is by far the most frequent appellation on modern maps. The change is due to machinations by the Japanese. At the end of the 19th century, Korea was not allowed to take part in the conference of the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO), and the Japanese delegation pressed for a resolution that a single name—“the Sea of Japan”— be applied. The Japanese got their way, as they were a major power in the Asia-Pacific at the time.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and 1905 ended in a Japanese victory, allowing Japan to dominate the region. Subsequently many more people around the world began to recognize the term “Japan Sea/Sea of Japan.” Meanwhile IHO published its first *Limits of Oceans & Seas* as a reference on the limits and names of subdivisions of the oceans and seas used by hydrographic offices to ensure uniformity when compiling various nautical documents. As such, this work is a must for the world’s oceanographers

and cartographers. The first edition was based on decisions passed at the IHO conference in Monaco in 1929, which included the exclusive use of the “Japan Sea/Sea of Japan.”

At the time, Korea was not in a position to lodge a protest. Japan ruled Korea as a colony from 1910 to 1945, depriving Korea of its national sovereignty and its rights to diplomatic representation on the world stage. During this period, the Japanese severely repressed Korean culture and Koreans were even forbidden from speaking their own language. The Korean’s mother tongue was banned, and time-honored Korean names were replaced by Japanese ones. Regrettably, subsequent editions of *Limits of Oceans & Seas* (the latest edition was published in 1953) have continued to use the “Sea of Japan” designation.

Naturally, Japan does not want the name “Sea of Japan” to be changed, and Japanese officials have submitted numerous arguments in support of their position. They insist this is a marginal sea cut off from the Pacific Ocean by the Japanese Archipelago. On the other hand, the

British Isles cut the body of water to the north off from the Atlantic Ocean, but the accepted name is “North Sea,” not “British Sea”. Figure 14

If the Japanese position towards naming were followed, the point raised by U.S. scholar Isaac Asimov would be fitting. In his *Words on the Map*, Professor Asimov observes that China held the power in the Far East before the Europeans came. The Chinese called themselves the “Middle Kingdom” because lands existed to the east and west. An island state was in the east, and the Chinese called it the “Eastern Kingdom.” These islanders accepted the Chinese line of reasoning and referred to themselves as the “Eastern Kingdom,” implying, however, that there was no great land 14,000 kilometers still further east.

In other words, the Japanese at one time thought of themselves as the inhabitants of the “Eastern Kingdom,” so they were amenable to the term “East Sea.” The Japanese need to be reminded of this fact more often. The Japanese also insist that Koreans only began to protest the “Sea of Japan” designation in 1992. However, the

Korean people have never accepted it and have constantly striven to retain the name “East Sea.” For example when the fishing pact was concluded in 1965, the Koreans used “East Sea” on the document, while the Japanese wrote “Sea of Japan.”

I believe one of the first steps toward convincing people of the historical and geographical appropriateness of the “East Sea” designation is to explain that many names have been used over the centuries. The “Norwegian Sea” example cited above can be applied. Namely, Russian chronicles from the 15th century refer to that body of water as the Murman Sea; “Murman” refers to the Norwegians and Danes.

A 1594 map by Flemish cartographer Gerardus Mercator bears the names “Norwegian Sea” and “Danish Sea,” while a map drawn by Neugebauer in 1612 includes “Murman Sea,” “Norwegian Sea” and “Danish Sea” all at the same time. The water separating Sakhalin Island from the Eurasian mainland is named “Strait of Nevelskoi” on an 1849 world map, in honor of Russian navigator Gennadi Ivanovich Nevelskoi.

Nevelskoi led an expedition in the Sakhalin area in 1848.

The Japanese call this same body of water Mamiya Strait after Rinzo Mamiya, who discovered it in 1808. The existence of this strait needed to be corroborated with data from geographer Kageyasu Takahashi (1785-1829), and a map published in 1809 was based on Mamiya's survey results <sup>Figure 12</sup>. Nevertheless, the first claim for the name went to discoverer Nevelskoi according to international law at the time because he documented the strait before anyone else. The government maintained a strict isolationist policy after the completion of the Meiji Restoration in 1869, so the Mamiya discovery remained unknown to the rest of the world. The Japanese authorities would deal harshly with anyone who tried to leak cartographic data to outsiders. <sup>4</sup>

The application of concurrent names has historical roots and has been recognized by international law for over 30 years now. On March 13, 1974, the IHO released Technical Resolution A.4.2.6. This general guide states:

"It is recommended that where two or more countries share a given geographical feature (such as, for example, a bay, strait, channel or islands) under a different name form, they should endeavor to reach agreement on fixing a single name for the feature concerned. If they have different official languages and cannot agree on a common name form, it is recommended that the name forms of each of the languages in question should be accepted for charts and publications unless technical reasons prevent this practice on small scale charts, e.g. English Channel/La Manche."

In 1977, the UN Group of Experts on Geographical Names (UNGEGN) adopted Resolution III/20 on "Names of Features beyond a Single Sovereignty," with a recommendation similar to that IHO Technical Resolution A.4.2.6. (Namely, "...when countries sharing a given geographical feature do not agree on a common name, it should be a general rule of cartography that the name used by each of the countries concerned will be accepted. A policy of accepting only one or some of such names while excluding

the rest would be inconsistent as well as inexpedient in practice.") Noteworthy examples in which this Resolution has been followed include English Channel/La Manche and Falkland Islands/Malvinas Islands.

Over 200 specialists took part in the Eighth United Nations Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names (UNCSGN) in Berlin between August 27 and September 5, 2002. The participants discussed the problem of rectifying diverse names used by different countries to refer to the same geographic feature.

From the opening of the meeting, Tokyo was at odds with Seoul and Pyongyang on the "Sea of

Japan" issue. The Japanese representatives resolutely argued for the retention of the name, whereas the North and South Koreans called for a revision to "East Sea." The Korean side won an important intermediate victory in the dispute, as the IHO finalized a resolution that the new edition of its reference book must be used by all cartographers around the world.

No reference to the "Sea of Japan" was mentioned in this work, indicating that the IHO recognizes how confrontational the naming of this particular body of water is. For expediency, the IHO has recommended the term "Sea of Japan/East Sea" to be used concurrently.

<sup>1</sup> Before the 19th century, the waters in question were called various names such as the "Sea of Joseon/Joseon Sea," "Gulf of Corea/Corea Gulf," "East Sea," "Oriental Sea," and "Sea of Japan/Japan Sea."

<sup>2</sup> The Japanese used the term "Sea of Japan" officially for the first time in 1855, after a revised edition was published of geographer Takahashi's *World Map*.

<sup>3</sup> The Goguryeo Kingdom (高句麗 37 BCE-668 CE) consisted of ethnic Korean tribes who controlled territory extending above the middle reaches of the Yalu River by the beginning

of the Common Era. This was one of the three early feudal states (Goguryeo, Silla and Baekje) occupying the Korean Peninsula. The Goguryeo capital was Hwandoeong (丸都城 at modern day Tungkou in southern Manchuria), and the name "Korea" originated from "Goguryeo."

<sup>4</sup> Dutch (Bavarian by birth) physician Philipp Von Siebold attempted to take the *Revised World Map* (1810) and other cartographic charts out of the country, resulting in the arrest of geographer Takahashi, who died in prison. About 50 other people involved in the incident were severely punished.



#### Life on Dokdo

Dokdo has for centuries provided a shelter for Korean fishermen operating in nearby waters. The pictured shelter for fishermen was renovated after typhoon *Maemi* pounded the island and partially damaged the facility in 2003.